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THE ROLE OF ADVERTISING IN THE
MUTUAL FUNDS INDUSTRYT
DAVID J. ROMANSKI*
The recent experience of mutual fund' net redemptions 2 brings
into sharp focus the necessity of maintaining, if not increasing, mutual
fund sales?' Where the redemption of a fund's shares exceeds its sales
by a substantial amount or for an extended period of time, the fund
may have to resort to liquidating some of its portfolio securities in
order to meet redemption demands. 4 A continuing pattern of net re-
t A substantial part of this article was prepared while the author was a Fellow at
the University of Pennsylvania Law School Center for the Study of Financial Institu-
tions. The author is indebted to the Director of the Center, Prof. Robert H. Mundheim,
for his counsel and assistance. This article bears a date of March 15, 1972.
* A.B., Fairfield University, 1967; J.D., Catholic University, 1970. The author is on
the staff of the Office of the General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission. The
Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for
any private publication by any of its employees. The views expressed in this article are
those of the author and are not to be attributed in any way to the Commission or to
the author's colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
1 The term "mutual fund" refers to an open-end management company as defined
in § 5(a)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(I) (1970).
The distinguishing feature of the mutual fund is that an investor may redeem his shares
at any time for their net asset value—i.e., the amount of the fund's net assets divided
by the number of its outstanding shares.
2 Mutual funds suffered net redemptions in May, June, July and September of
1971. Sales of fund shares in 1971 totalled $5.2 billion while redemptions totalled $4,8
billion. The $400 million gain compares with a $1.6 billion gain in 1970. See 136 I3NA
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. A-16 (Jan. 26, 1972). During January, 1972, mutual funds expe-
rienced $475.8 million in redemptions although sales were $521.3 million. See Wall Street
Journal, March 21, 1972, at 12, col. 3. For February, 1972, redemptions reached an all
time high of $513.9 million while sales were only $404 million. Id. These sale and re-
demption statistics were compiled by the Investment Company Institute (ICI) and cover
its members only. The ICI, however, represents member funds with more than 90% of
the total assets of the mutual fund industry.
8 The term sales refers not only to "new" sales, i.e., to people who are not already
shareholders but also to the reinvestment of dividends and capital gains distributions by
existing fund shareholders.
4 Generally, mutual funds hold a certain percentage of liquid assets, e.g., cash, U.S.
Government and short term bonds, for the purpose of meeting redemptions. For example,
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demptions on an industry-wide basis coupled with the liquidation of
fund portfolio securities could have an adverse effect on the stock
market in general.'
Given this necessity continually to sell new shares, one would
expect that the mutual fund industry would utilize extensively the
primary marketing tool for American business: advertising. However,
this is not the case. The Institutional Investor Study Report of the
Securities and Exchange Comniissione (Study) found, among other
things, that over forty percent of the mutual fund complex advisers
surveyed considered advertising so unimportant as a promotional
device that it was never used.' The authors of the Study suggested
that "[Once advertising is typically one of the lowest cost promo-
tional devices for American business, the reasons for this lack of usage
may be regulatory constraints."' In the case of mutual funds, these
constraints are indeed formidable.
The legal restraints on mutual fund advertising result from the
fact that a mutual fund, in addition to registering with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) as an investment company,' must
also register, pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), the
.shares it proposes to issue. In addition, Section 5(b) (1) of the 1933
Actl° prohibits the transmission of interstate commerce of any pro-
spectus relating to any security unless the prospectus meets the re-
the ICI has reported that in December, 1971, the total assets of its members was $55.1
billion, of which $3.0 billion was in the form of cash. 136 BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. A-16
(Jan. 26, 1972).
5 For example, if funds liquidate huge blocks of a particular security, the price of
that security will drop. This drop may have no relationship whatever to the financial
condition of the company involved, yet it will occur. If the liquidation occurs in a bear
(down) market, it will only serve to reinforce the downward trend. Large scale liquida-
tions may als6 put a strain on the operational facilities in the securities industry, which
has not as yet recovered from the operational crisis of 1968-69.
0
 H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC Insti-
tutional Investor Study].
7
 Id. at 203 table IV-39. The fund complex advisers were asked to indicate whether
advertising was important for obtaining new business. The survey covered the years
1964 and 1969. Of the 29 firms responding for 1964, 48.28% considered advertising unim-
portant while 38.46% of the 39 firms responding for 1969 considered advertising unimpor-
tant. A fund complex was defined in the study as an "advisory firm where more than
one-third of assets being advised (as of September 30, 1969) were represented by assets
of registered investment companies." Id. at 142.
8
 Id. at 196. The New York Times interpreted this suggestion as a recommendation
that the existing advertising restrictions be liberalized. N.Y. Times, March Il, 1971, at 59,
col. 3. The author has been informed by a reliable source connected with the Institu-
tional Investor Study that this is exactly what was intended.
° Section 7(a)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-7(a)(1)
(1970).
10 IS U.C.S. 1 77e(b)(1) (1970).
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quirements of Section 10 of that Act.' The term "prospectus" is de-
fined to include, inter alia, any written advertisement which offers any
security for sale. 12 The phrase "offers for sale" is defined to include
"every attempt to offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy,
a security or interest in security, for value."' Thus an advertisement
which "offers for sale" a security is deemed a prospectus and there-
fore must conform to the requirements of Section 10 in order to satisfy
Section 5 (b) (1).
The above statutory scheme does not prohibit all advertising by
mutual funds. Only those advertisements which offer a security for
sale are covered,14 and oral communications (except on radio and tele-
vision) are not included in the definition of "prospectus" even if a
security is offered for sale." In addition to these two exceptions, Sec-
tion 2(10) (b) of the 1933 Act allows for the familiar "tombstone ad"-
i.e., an advertisement which "states from whom a . . . [Section 10
prospectus] may be obtained and, in addition, does no more than
identify the security, state the price thereof, and state by whom orders
11
 15 U,S.C. § 775 (1970). This section sets forth the detailed information required
in the prospectus.
12 Section 2(10) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1970). Ad-
vertisements on radio and television which offer securities for sale are also considered
prospectuses.
12 Id. § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) 1970. The phrase "for value" is important. Most
funds prefer that their shareholders reinvest dividend and capital gains distributions. In
fact, some funds require reinvestment. See IDS New Dimensions Fund, Inc., Prospectus
3 (March 12, 1971). If the dividends or capital gains are distributed as stock, or if the
shareholder is given the option of receiving stock in lieu of cash, then the shares issued
as dividends or capital gains need not be registered since there is no "sale" of shares
"for value." See SEC Securities Act Release No. 929 (July 29, 1936), 1 CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. lf 1121 (1971); H.R. Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1933).
14 The terms "offer to sell" and "prospectus" are defined broadly. They "are not
limited to communications which constitute an offer in the common law contract sense,
or which on their face purport to offer a security. Rather . . . they include 'any docu-
ment which is designed to procure orders for a security,'" See Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades &
Co., 38 S.E.C. 843, 848 (1959); SEC Securities Act Release No. 2623 (July 25, 1941),
1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. lf 3198 (1971).
12 Oral communications are, however, subject to the antifraud provisions of the fed-
eral securities laws. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 12(2), 17(a), 15 U.S.C. n 77 1 (2),
77q(a) (1970). Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971). After December 14, 1971, an investment adviser whose only
clients are investment companies and who uses the mails or other instrumentalities of
interstate commerce must register as an investment adviser. Investment Advisers Act of
1940 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (1964), as amended, Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-547, § 24(a), 84 Stat. 1413. A registered investment adviser is subject to the. anti-
fraud provisions contained in that Act. Id, if 6, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970). As a practical
matter, it is difficult, if not impossible, to enforce these antifraud provisions except after
fact. University of Pennsylvania, Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 659,
777 (1967) (remarks of Mr. Loomis, General Counsel, SEC).
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will be executed . . . ." 19
 Pursuant to authority granted in section
2(10), the SEC has adopted Rule 134, 17 which indicates the type of
information an issuer, including a mutual fund, can include in a tomb-
stone ad." The Chief Counsel of the SEC's Division of Corporate
Finance has interpreted Rule 134'9 to allow a mutual fund to include°
in a tombstone ad (1) a general indication of the type of fund, the type
of its portfolio and the manner in which its shares are offered; (2)
identification of the fund as a "no-load" fund or reference to the fact
that is has no sales load or employs no salesmen; (3) a brief iden-
tification of the fund's policy, for example, "an investment in this fund
includes diversification and participation in a broad list of com-
panies .. . ."; (4) a listing of the industry components of the fund
but only for the purpose of fairly identifying the investment policy
of the fund; (5) the date the fund started in business or a simple
announcement inviting the attention of special groups; and (6) the
name of the fund's adviser, for identification purposes only.
In summary, a mutual fund (including its investment adviser and
18
 Securities Act of 1933 § 2(10) (b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10)(b) (1970). Unlike tomb-
stone ads for the usual corporate issue, those circulated by a registered open-end in-
vestment company or its underwriter must be filed with the Commission within 10 days
after they are first used or published. Investment Company Act of 1940 24(b), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-24(b) (1970); SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 150 (June 20,
1941), 3 CCH Fed. Sec, L. Rep. 11 48,898 (1971). If the ad's sponsor is a member of
the NASD, as most are, the ad must also be filed with it within 3 days after its first use
or publication. CCH NASD Manual 11 5002 (1971).
17
 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (1971).
18
 In proposing to adopt Rule 134, the SEC made it clear that tombstone advertise-
ments "are intended to be limited to announcements identifying the existence of a public
offering and the availability of a prospectus and they are not to be selling literature of
any kind." SEC Securities Act Release No. 3535 (March 10, 1955), CCH [1952-1956
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 76,333. Recently, the SEC published proposed
Amendments to Rule 134 and asked for public comments. See SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5213, 37 Fed. Reg. 2596 (Dec. 1, 1971). These proposed amendments will be dis-
cussed more fully at pp. 1010-1015 infra.
19
 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4709 (July 14, 1964), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 1461 (1971).
28
 Those items of information which would not be within the scope of Rule 134
and which, therefore, may not be included in a tombstone ad are:
a. a listing of the fund's portfolio or identification of those companies whose
securities make up the largest holdings in the portfolio;
b. photographs, although the investment company's trademark may be used;
c. the name of the transfer agent, or the custodian, or a statement that assets
are held by an independent custodian;
d. statements setting forth the number of fund shareholders or the amount of
total fund assets;
e. references to fund performance relative to the Dow Jones or any other stock
average;
f. statements as to the present value of past investment in the fund; and
g. quotations of various experts concerning industries in which the fund has in-
vested.
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underwriter),21 before the delivery of a prospectus meeting the re-
quirements of section 10, 22 may advertise its product either orally or
by a written advertisement (including radio and television) which con-
tains only such information as is permitted by section 2(10) (b), Rule
134 and Interpretative Release No. 4709. Of course, an advertisement
which does not offer a security for sale is not considered a prospectus.
As noted, however, the term "offer for sale" is broadly defined and
even more broadly interpreted.' Further, under the federal scheme,
any advertisement, written or oral, is subject to the antifraud pro-
visions of the federal securities la.ws.24
The result of these statutory restrictions on mutual fund ad-
vertising has forced funds to utilize other methods to encourage the
sale of their shares. This article will review those other methods and
recent developments which may jeopardize their continued availability.
It will also consider the legislative policy underlying the advertising
restrictions as well as the recent SEC proposals which relax the
existing restrictions on mutual fund advertising. Finally, considera-
tion will be given to problems that would confront those mutual funds
which decide to advertise extensively their product.
21
 A fund's investment adviser and underwriter are subject to the same restrictions
as the fund itself since both are "persons" as defined by § 2(2) of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1970). The prohibitions in § 5 apply to "any person." Id. § 5,
15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
22
 This is not to say that once a prospectus meeting the requirements of § 10 is de-
livered to the investor all regulation over advertising ceases. The National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), which is the only national securities association regis-
tered pursuant to § 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(a)
(1970), and which in fiscal year 1971, had 4,390 member broker-dealers, 37 SEC Ann.
Rep. 87 (1971), administers as to its members the SEC's Statement of Policy with re-
gard to investment company advertising and supplementary sales material. See CCH
NASD Manual 11 5001-253 (1971). The SEC administers its Statement of Policy as to
those broker-dealers who are registered with it but who are not members of the NASD.
In fiscal year 1971, there were 301 such broker-dealers. 37 SEC Ann. Rep. 94. For a dis-
cussion of the NASD's role in the area of mutual fund advertising, see Mattlin, The
Trials and Tribulations of Mutual Fund Advertising, Inst. Inv. 21, 25 (March, 1971).
23 See note 14 supra.
24 See note 15 supra. Mutual fund advertising may also be subject to state Blue-
Sky Laws. In California, for, example, any advertisement (defined in Cal. Corp. Code
§ 25002 (West Supp. 1971)) concerning a security must be filed with the California
Securities Commission at least 3 days prior to its publication. Id. § 25300(a). Any ad
which is permitted or required by § 5(b)(2) or § 2(10)(b) of the Securities Act of
1933 and concerns a security registered under that Act need not be filed. Id. § 25300(b)
(4). An advertisement (other than a tombstone) relating to the securities of an invest-
ment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 will not be disap-
proved if it complies with the SEC's Statement of Policy. Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 10, §
260.302(h) in CCM Blue Sky Rep. 13 8637 (1972). See also H. Marsh, Jr. & R. Volk,
Practice Under The California Corporate Securities Law of 1968, 382-94 (1969).
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I, THE SALE OF MUTUAL FUND SHARES
Because of the legal restraints on mutual fund advertising, most
funds have developed distribution systems whose object is to maxi-
mize fund sales. Prior to a consideration of the role which more
liberalized advertising rules might have in this sales effort, existing
methods of distributing fund shares will be considered.
A. The Mutual Fund Structure
Most mutual funds are unique in that the day-to-day operations
of the fund are contracted out to an investment adviser which, although
it may have formed and promoted the fund, remains a separate and
distinct organization." It is not uncommon for one advisory organiza-
tion to form and manage a group of funds, commonly known as a fund
complex." In return for a management fee, which usually is based
on a percentage of the fund's net assets," the adviser provides the
fund with investment research and analysis and makes the investment
decisions concerning the fund's portfolio. Besides the advisory func-
tion, the management fee may cover such nonadvisory expenses as
the salaries of the fund's officers and directors, and the cost of office
space and bookkeeping services." Except for no-load funds," the
management fee does not cover, nor does the fund adviser usually
engage in, the distribution of fund shares. This function belongs to the
fund's principal underwriter."
25 Some funds are internally managed, that is, they maintain an in-house manage-
ment staff. For a discussion of internally versus externally managed investment companies
see, SEC, Report on the Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth,
H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 102-14 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PPI].
Since publication of the PPI, the MIT complex described in the report, id. at 104-06,
has switched to external management. See Memorandum of the SEC as amicus curiae in
opposition to the proposed settlement in Gross v. Moses, 115 liNA SEC Reg. & L. Rep.,
(Aug. 18, 1971) at F-1._
96
 PPI,. supra note 15, at 47-49. For a comprehensive discussion of mutual fund
complexes, see Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund Complexes, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 205
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Glazer].
27
 The Institutional Investor Study found that 73% of the advisers to registered
investment companies surveyed based their fees on a percentage of assets under manage-
ment. SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 6, at 209. The average advisory fee
ratio (i.e.; 1969 advisory fee divided by total assets under advisement as of Sept. 30,
1969) for registered investment companies was 0.45%. Id. at 208, 216 (table IV-43).
28 There is no "standard" advisory contract. The services which are provided the
fund by the adviser in return for the fee vary among funds. Id. at 207; PPI, supra note
25, at 90-92. Some funds charge two fees, one covering only the advisory services and
the other covering administrative expenses. Id. at 92-94.
29 A no-load fund is one which sells its shares at net asset value without the imposi-
tion of a sales load. PPI, supra note 25, at 204. See discussion at pp. 965-66 infra.
80 For a discussion of the role of the principal underwriter of a mutual fund see
PPI, supra note 25, at 54-55.
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B. Who Distributes Fund Shares
There have developed over the years four main types of mutual
fund distribution organizations. The first is what has been termed
a fully-integrated organization.' Such an organization may consist of
one company that acts both as adviser and principal underwriter to
a fund or fund complex; or it may consist of separate but affiliated
companies, with one providing advisory services and another acting
as principal underwriter. The major feature of the fully-integrated
organization is that it employs, either on a full or part-time basis, its
own "captive" sales force, that is, retail salesmen who sell fund
shares directly to the public. 32 The salesmen in the fully-integrated
organization resemble the more familiar insurance agent and, in fact,
they may sell, in addition to fund shares, life insurance policies, vari-
able annuities, face-amount certificates and periodic investment -plans
which are issued by companies affiliated with the principal under-
writer ;113
The second main type of distribution organization is best de-
scribed as semi-integrated. Unlike the fully-integrated organization, it
distributes fund shares not only through a captive sales force but also
through independent broker-dealers who may offer to the public the
shares of many different funds." In some cases, even the captive re-
tailers of the principal underwriter may sell the shares of other funds,"
although they are encouraged to sell the shares of the funds with
which the principal underwriter is affiliated.
A third type of distribution organization is one which does not
consist of an organization in the formal sense. A small number of funds
sell their shares directly to the public, at a price equal W their current
net asset value. These funds charge no sales load (hence the name "no-
load"), although they may impose a redemption charge. Without a
81 SEC, Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong,,
1st Sess. 102-04 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Special Study]; PPI, supra note 25, at 56.
82 Since fully-integrated organisations like Investment Diversified Services (IDS)
sell their fund shares directly to the public and their salesmen do not sell the shares of
other funds, there is no need for the dealer discount afforded to members of the NASD.
See Art. III, § 26(c) of The NASD's Rules of Fair Practice, CCH NASD Manual
§ 2176 (1971). Thus there is no advantage to joining the NASD. Special Study, supra
note 31, at 103. However, they must still meet the , qualifications set by the SEC for
broker-dealers. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b) (8), 15 U.S.C. § 780(b)(8)
(1970) ; 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b8-1 (1971).
BB Special Study, supra note 31, at 103.
84 Id. at 104.
88 Unlike the participants in the fully-integrated organization, those in the semi-
integrated organization are usually members of the NASD, so as to be eligible for the
dealer discount which is available only to NASD members. NASD, Rules of Fair
Practice, Art.' III, § 26(c), CCH NASD Manual 12176 (1971). The dealer discount is
important to those captive retailers who sell the shares of other funds.
,965
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
sales load, these funds cannot support a more formal sales organiza-
tion" and their promotional activities are limited to tombstone ads
published by their investment advisers. 87 No-load funds are generally
sponsored either by established counseling firms or by brokerage con-
cerns as a service to their clients.38
The fourth and predominant type of distribution organization is
the non-integrated distribution organization." Unlike the fully- and
semi-integrated organizations, this system does not utilize captive re-
tail salesmen. Rather, the fund sells its shares on a wholesale basis to
independent broker-dealers who then retail them to the public. The
principal underwriter, one usually affiliated with the investment ad-
viser of the fund which it underwrites, endeavors to involve as many
broker-dealers as possible in the distribution system, in order to get
maximum exposure for the shares of its funds." Naturally, involving
broker-dealers also entails devising ways to compensate them.
C. Compensation of Participants in the Saks Process
I. Apportioning the Sales Load
In offering their shares to the public, most mutual funds impose
a sales charge, which the investor pays in addition to the current net
asset value of the shares purchased. Although the sales load may vary
among funds, the prevailing rate is 8.5 percent of the total purchase
price or, expressed differently, 9.3 percent of the amount actually in-
vested.' Some funds provide for a "sliding" sales charge which varies
86 Some no-load funds sell their shares through an underwriter which is owned by
the fund's adviser. Since there is no sales charge to cover the expenses of the underwriter,
it is subsidized by the adviser. See Glazer, supra note 26, at 210 n.40.
37 Special Study, supra note 31, at 110. No-load funds may also induce retail dealers
to sell their shares by directing fund portfolio brokerage to them. PPI, supra note 25,
at 59. For a more complete discussion of this use of portfolio brokerage as a reward for
selling fund Shares, see text accompanying notes 51-81 infra.
88 Special Study, supra note 31, at 110; PPI, supra note 25, at 58-59.
86 Special Study, supra note 31, at 105-07.
40 In order to be eligible for the dealer discount both the principal underwriter and
the independent broker-dealers must be members of the NASD. NASD, Rules of Fair
Practice, Art. III, § 26(c), CCH NASD Manual V 2176 (1971). In addition, a sales agree-
ment must be in effect between the underwriter and the individual broker-dealers. Id.
§ 26(c)(2). •
41 At a rate of 8.5%, a sales load of $8.50 is deducted from a $100 purchase. Thus,
$91.50 is actually invested. The $8.50 is approximately 9.3% of $91.50. PPI, supra note 25,
at 52. The SEC considered this sales load too high when compared to the costs of other
securities transactions. Id. at 209-15. It recommended that the sales load not exceed 5%
of the net asset value of the fund share. Id. at 223. The 1970 Investment Company
Amendmenti Act changed the "unconscionable or grossly excessive" standard of § 22(b)
of the Investment Company Act of 1940 to require that the price at which a mutual
fund share is offered or sold to the public shall not include "an excessive sales load."
Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 12, 84 Stat. 1413. The SEC has the final
say as to what is an "excessive sales load." Id.
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as the amount invested increases. For example, an investor who in-
vests $10,000 or less may pay the full 8.5 percent, while an investor
who invests $75,000 may only pay a sales charge of 4.0 percent." The
sales load is set by the fund; it is illegal for any dealer to sell the
shares of a fund for less than their net asset value, plus the prescribed
sales load."
In almost all cases, the sales load is used to pay the costs of dis-
tributing fund shares, that is, to pay participants in the distribution
chain. In the case of fully- and semi-integrated organizations which
maintain their own captive sales forces, the principal underwriter usu-
ally retains a portion of the sales load to cover its overhead and other
expenses connected with the distribution and sale of the shares of the
fund." The remainder of the sales load is used to compensate sales
supervisory personnel, as well as the salesmen who actually sell the
shares. Since the retail salesmen are compensated on a commission
basis, their total compensation is limited only by the number of shares
that they can sell."
The allocation of the sales load . is somewhat different for non-
integrated organizations and that part of the semi-integrated organiza-
tion which utilizes independent broker-dealers. As previously noted, a
majority of funds distribute their shares through a principal under-
writer that sells them on a wholesale basis to many broker-dealers,"
who then retail them to the public at their "current offering price,"
that is, current net asset value plus the prescribed sales load. 47 From
42 PPI, supra note 25, at 52. Mast mutual funds allow an investor to submit a
statement of intention whereby the investor indicates that he will purchase more fund
shares within thirteen months of his initial investment. If the investor does purchase the
shares during the period, his total investment is viewed as having been made at one time
and the sales load is reduced. For an example of this procedure, see id. at 205-06.
43 See § 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d)
(1970). This section is accurately described as the 1940 Act's resale price maintenance
provision. PPI, supra note 25, at 218. The failure of the 1970 Investment Company
Amendments Act to repeal I 22(d) may indicate that that section is to prevail over any
other conflicting law of the United States, including the antitrust laws, with regard to
resale price maintenance. Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 4 12(c), 84 Stat.
1413. •
44 Section 15(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(b)
(1970) makes it illegal for an underwriter to "offer for sale, sell, or deliver after sale any
security . ." of a registered investment company unless pursuant to a written contract
which sets forth the terms of the agreement. The major incidental expenses of the
underwriter: are the cost of printing and distributing prospectuses and supplementary
sales material supplied to retailers and other promotional activities (including advertising).
Special Study, supra note 31, at 109.
45 For a discussion of the sales techniques used by mutual fund salesmen, see Special
Study, supra note 31, at 124-39.
40 See text accompanying note 34 supra.
47 See text accompanying note 41 supra. Since both the underwriters and the broker-
dealers involved in the non-integrated and semi-integrated organizations are usually
members of the NASD, so as to avail themselves of the dealer discount, they are pro-
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an 8.5 percent sales load, the principal underwriter usually retains
from 0.50 to 2.5 percent, while the independent broker-dealer retains
the remaining 6.0 to 8.0 percent." As in the case of the fully-integrated
organization, the part of the load retained by the principal underwriter
is used to cover overhead and incidental expenses and, it is hoped, to
provide a profit. Of the portion retained by the broker-dealer, part
(usually one-half) is to cover the broker-dealer's overhead and other
expenses, with the remainder (the other half—three to four percent—
going to the dealer's salesmen actually selling the shares.
Since the independent broker-dealers may sell the shares of many
funds, a principal underwriter must somehow induce them to sell the
shares of its funds rather than those of other funds. The usual method
used by fund underwriters is to vary the dealer concession, that is, to
give the broker-dealers a larger share of the sales load for selling the
fund shares distributed by the underwriter. In the case of the semi-
integrated organization, the underwriter usually gives its captive re-
tailers a larger share of the sales load for selling the shares of its fund
than it does when the retailer sells the shares of another fund." Sim-
ilarly, an independent broker-dealer can induce a salesman to sell the
shares of a particular fund (e.g., one which grants a larger concession
to the dealer) simply by giving the salesman a higher concession for
selling the shares of that fund.
2. Use of Portfolio Brokerage to Reward Those Who Sell Fund
Shares 5°
In addition to the direct compensation resulting from allocation
of the sales load, retail broker-dealers often receive extra compensation
in the form of brokerage commissions generated by a fund's portfolio
transactions." Since a fund's investment adviser usually has absolute
hibited from purchasing mutual fund shares except to cover purchase orders already
received. NASD, Rules of Fair Practice, Art. HI, 26(f)(2), CCEI NASD Manual
ff 2176 (1971).
48
 PPI, supra note 25, at 207. Special Study, supra note 31, at 108-09.
49 PPI, supra note 25, at 207-08. In the semi-integrated organization both the
underwriter and salesmen are broker-dealers and members of the NASD. See note 35
supra. Since the captive retailers in this type of organization sell the shares of funds
other than those of the principal underwriter, the underwriter is in effect a dealer and
is entitled to a dealer's concession on the sale of fund shares, other than its own, which
its captive retailers sell. Thus it can vary the salesman's commission to induce him to
sell the underwriter's fund shares. See, e.g., PPI, supra note 25, at 208 n.29.
55 The allocation of fund portfolio brokerage commissions has been the subject of
considerable study by the SEC and others. See Special Study, supra note 31, at 213-35;
Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R. Rep. No.
2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 525-39 (1962) [hereinafter cited as the Wharton Report].
See also Glazer, supra note 26, at 250-59.
51 A fund's investment adviser continually purchases and sells securities for the
fund's portfolio. The average annual turnover rate (defined as total cash purchases or
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discretion in placing fund portfolio business' (recall that a fund's
adviser is usually also the underwriter or closely affiliated with the
underwriter), it can channel brokerage commissions to those broker-
dealers who sell its fund shares.' The use of fund portfolio brokerage
as a reward for sales is possible because, under a system of fixed min-
imum commissions," the commissions paid by a fund" are frequently
far in excess of the actual cost of executing the fund's order. The SEC
has noted that "[a]lthough a large order may make greater demands
on a broker than a small one, member brokers can profitably execute
and clear transactions for investment companies and other large insti-
tutional customers at a cost which is only a fraction of the commissions
they must charge."56 The difference between the actual cost of execu-
tion and the commission paid has come to be known as "disposable
brokerage"" or "soft dollars." These dollars are used both to reward
those who sell fund shares" and to compensate broker-dealers who
total cash sales, whichever is smaller, of common stock during the 12 months preceding
September 30, 1969, divided by the average market value of the common stock during the
previous 12 month period) for registered investment companies was 56.7 percent. SEC
Institutional Investor Study, supra note 6, at 170, 189 (table IV-29). The study found
also that accounts advised in fund complexes (defined as an advisory firm where more
than one-third of the assets being advised, as of September 30, 1969, were represented
by assets of registered investment companies) tended to have substantially higher turn-
over rates. Id. at 174, 192 (table IV-32).
52 The Institutional Investor Study found that in 65% of the cases where the
adviser to a registered investment company places purchases and sell orders, the adviser
had total (100%) discretion in allocating brokerage business. SEC Institutional Investor
Study, supra note 6, at 169, 188 (table IV-28). In 27% of the cases, the client (the fund)
designated the allocation of the brokerage business. Id.
53 Fully-integrated organizations like IDS do not have to use portfolio brokerage as
an added inducement to dealers to sell their fund shares since they are sold by a captive
retail force. PPI, supra note 25, at 165. Such an organization may, however, use portfolio
brokerage to compensate broker-dealers who provide the fund with other services such
as supplementary research. See IDS New Dimensions Fund, Inc., Prospectus 6 (March 12,
1971). In some cases the salesman received a portion of the reciprocal brokerage on the
portfolio transactions of the fund whose shares he sold. Special Study, supra note 31, at
124. In other cases, the salesman receives, in lieu of a portion of the portfolio brokerage,
a higher percentage of the sales load for selling funds which will direct reciprocal broker-
age to his employer. Id.
04 All national securities exchanges (NYSE, Amex and the regional stock exchanges)
require their members to charge established minimum commissions to nonmembers. See,
e.g., NYSE Const., Art. XV, 2(a), (b), 2 CCH N.Y. Stock Exch. Guide If 1702 (1972).
In the over-the-counter (OTC) and third markets (over-the-counter trading in ex-
change listed securities) there are no fixed minimum commissions. Rather, market-makers
compete with each other on a price basis, that is, they purchase and sell securities on a
principal basis and make their profits on the spread between their purchase and sale price.
In the fourth market, buyers and sellers usually deal directly with each other. For a
general discussion of the various securities markets see, PPI, supra note 25, at 156-61.
as The commissions charged on fund portfolio transactions are a capital expense of
the fund. They are not an expense which is covered by the management fee.
50 PPI, supra note 25, at 163.
57 Id. at 162-63.
58 The Institutional Investor Study found that in 1968 "[m]ost fund commission
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provide the fund's investment adviser with other' services, such as
research,' portfolio valuation and communication facilities."
a. Direct .Reciprocity.—The simplest way to channel portfolio
brokerage to broker-dealers who sell fund shares is to place fund port-
folio business directly with them. As in so many cases, however, the
simplest way is not always possible. The shares of a particular fund
may be sold by hundreds, even thousands of independent broker-deal-
ers, some of whom are members of a national securities exchange while
others operate only in the over-the-counter (OTC) market. It would
be impractical, if not impossible, to direct portfolio business to all of
them. Some of the non-exchange member broker-dealers do little more
than sell mutual fund shares" and they typically do not make markets
in either listed" or unlisted securities. If such a broker-dealer were to
receive an order from a fund, it would have to take it to a market-
maker for execution. The SEC has held in one case that "the use of
a broker-dealer to execute transactions on behalf of the Funds in
securities in which such broker-dealer did not make a market, con-
stituted a fraud upon the Funds and their shareholders!'" This ruling
was based on the finding that the officers of the funds involved "had a
fiduciary responsibility to the Funds and their shareholders to seek the
most favorable execution of portfolio transactions ..."" and that pay-
ing a broker-dealer (in this case one selling fund shares) a fee for
executing an order through a market-maker, when the fund could
dollars . . . were paid to mutual fund sellers." H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
2284 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC Institutional Investor Study]. "[O]i 40 invest-
ment company complexes whose funds were distributed by independent broker-dealers
. . . 62 percent of the commission paid (to the random sample of broker-dealers) was
paid to sellers of their funds." Id. Of these 40 complexes, "nine . , . distributed at least 90
percent of their commission dollars to sellers of their shares. An additional 10 distributed
between 70 and 90 percent to fund sellers." Id. at 2294 (table XIII-83).
66
 For calendar year 1968, the advisers to 49 fund complexes surveyed allocated $58.3
million, or 23.1% of their $252.1 million in commissions for research. The median invest-
ment company complex paid out 27.3% of its commissions for research. SEC Institutional
Investor Study, supra note 58, at 2263, 2267 (table XIII-68). Some funds, notably the
smaller dealer-distributed ones, allocate almost all their portfolio brokerage for research
since they cannot afford to maintain a full-time research staff. PPI, supra note 25, at
166-67.
60 SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 58, at 2273-74.
Cl Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R.	 240.15c3-1 (1971) requires a broker-dealer whose
activity is limited to purchasing and selling mutual fund shares and who meets other
specified requirements to maintain net capital of only $2,500 while broker-dealers generally
are required to maintain net capital of not less than $5,000.
62 The trading of exchange listed securities in the OTC market is commonly known
as the "third market." See PPI, supra note 25, at 159-61.
83 Delaware Management Co., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
1 77,458 at 82,886.
64 Id. at 82,885.
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have gone directly to the market-maker, was a breach of their fiduciary
duty to obtain the "best execution.""
In the case of broker-dealers who belong to an exchange, the prob-
lems are slightly different since all national securities exchanges have
fixed minimum-commission rates which their members must charge
nonmembers. Thus a fund pays the same commission regardless of
which member or member firm executes the order. Most fund man-
agers, however, believe that placing orders with all the exchange mem-
ber broker-dealers who sell shares of their fund would "impose an
undue burden on their trading departments and would be inconsistent
with good portfolio management."" Before the customer-directed give-
up was abolished in December, 1968, 07 it was common practice for
funds to place their orders with a few primary or "lead" brokers be-
cause not all the exchange member broker-dealers which the fund
wished to reward for selling fund shares had the capacity to execute
fund-size orders." The lead broker would then give up a portion of the
commission received upon executing the order to other exchange mem-
bers designated by the fund. In this way, a fund could use the most
experienced and qualified brokers to execute its portfolio transactions
while at the same time rewarding other broker-dealers who sold its
shares. Since give-ups were abolished, the number of NYSE members
receiving commission business directly from investment companies has
increased."
Techniques have developed whereby broker-dealers who sell fund
shares but who are not members of the NYSE can benefit from the
reciprocal business placed with NYSE members. For example, a fund
could place portfolio business with an NYSE firm "courtesy of" an
See also Consumer-Investor Planning Corp., L1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,677; Glazer, supra note 26, at 241-44.
00
 PPI, supra note 25, at 167. Since most portfolio transactions involve stock which
is listed on the NYSE, there is considerable incentive for NYSE members to sell fund
shares. In 1969, NYSE members accounted for 38% of total fund sales. SEC Institutional
Investor Study, supra note 58, at 2284. Some NYSE listed stock is also traded on
regional exchanges and in the third-market. To the extent that best-execution is obtained,
a fund could execute orders through members of the regional exchange or a third market
broker-dealer, thus providing them with commissions as a reward for selling fund shares.
07 The use of give-ups will be discussed more fully at text accompanying notes 71-81
infra.
00
 In 1966 the average mutual fund order executed on the NYSE was 1,730 shares,
In 1969, the average order was 3,726 shares. SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note
58, at 2169 (table XIII-7). In addition, many NYSE members do not have floor brokers
or clearance facilities of their own, and must execute their orders through other members
who do maintain such facilities. PPI, supra note 25, at 168 n.59.
09 SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 58, at 2205. Most funds, of course,
still place orders with their former "lead" brokers. In addition, they may place orders
with the smaller broker-dealers described in the preceding footnote. The small broker-
dealer charges the fund the full NYSE commission but must pay out of the commission
a floor brokerage and clearance fee to the member firm which provides those services.
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OTC broker-dealer who sells fund shares. In return, the NYSE mem-
ber might place some of its unrelated OTC business with that broker-
dealer." In the case of a broker-dealer not a member of the NYSE but
belonging to a regional exchange, the NYSE member can reciprocate
by placing its regional exchange business with that broker-dealer. This
latter situation usually involves dually listed securities, since most of
the securities traded on regional exchanges are of local interest only.
In return for reciprocals received "courtesy of" the regional exchange
member, the NYSE member (who may also be a member of the same
regional exchange) will execute unrelated transactions on that ex-
change but the execution ticket will be made out to the regional mem-
ber who will then be entitled to a portion of the commission. By using
these techniques, a fund can use its portfolio brokerage to reward sel-
lers of its shares.
b. Customer-Directed Give-Ups."—Prior to December 5, 1968,
the primary method used by mutual funds to channel portfolio broker-
age to broker-dealers who sold fund shares was the customer-directed
give-up. As noted, through this device a broker-dealer who received
commissions for executing fund orders would, at the fund's direction,
give up a portion of the commission received to another broker-dealer
who had not participated in the execution but who had sold fund
shares or provided other services to the fund. An NYSE member firm
prohibited from sharing commissions with nonmembers" would often
be willing to give up from sixty to seventy percent of the commissions
received on fund business to other members of the exchange."
On the regional exchanges a fund had much more latitude. Be-
sides being able to allocate give-ups to other members of the exchange,
most regional exchanges allowed a member to give up part of its com-
missions to broker-dealers who were not members of the exchange but
70
 PPI, supra note 25, at 168.
71
 Prior to their abolition, customer-directed give-ups received the scrutiny of the
SEC. See Special Study, supra note 31, at 213-35; PPI, supra note 25, at 169-88; SEC
Institutional Investor Study, supra note 58, at 2182-2213; University of Pennsylvania,
Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 659, 823-54 (1967); Comment, Conflicts
of Interest in the Allocation of Mutual Fund Brokerage Business, 80 Yale L.J. 372,
380-81 (1970).
72
 NYSE Const., Art. XV, 1, 2 CCH N.Y. Stock Exch. Guide 11 1701 (1971).
73 PPI, supra note 25, at 170. There were two major types of give-ups: give-up by
check and the floor give-up. In the former, the confirming broker would send checks at
the end of each month to the other brokers designated by the customer. In the case of
the floor give-up, the broker-dealer would execute the order but another broker desig-
nated by the customer would confirm it. The latter would receive the full commission
out of which it would pay the executing broker a floor brokerage commission (usually
10% of the full commission) and perhaps a clearing commission (another 10%) if the
executing broker also cleared the trade. SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 58,
at 2183.
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who were members of the NASD. 74
 The SEC's report on the Public
Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth (PPI) described
how mutual funds made use of the regional exchanges:
The large orders that the funds usually place can seldom
be matched on the floor of a regional exchange with either an
order of corresponding size or a sufficient number of smaller
orders to permit the execution of a trade. Thus, fund orders
on regional exchanges are given either to an NYSE member
firm which is also a regional exchange member or to one of a
small number of regional-only members who specialize in
large transactions . .
When a regional exchange member has "found the other
side," settled the price, and arranged for the transaction, he
instructs a floor broker on the regional exchange to sell a
specified quantity of a particular security on behalf of a
designated seller at a prearranged price and to buy the same
quantity of the same security at the same price on behalf of
a designated buyer. A transaction of this type is known as a
"cross." Each side to the transaction pays ... a full exchange
commission. . . .
A small portion of the resulting commission (usually
about 10 per cent) goes to the floor broker. The balance is
paid to the broker who actually brought the parties together
and he, in turn, pays an agreed portion to the over-the-
counter dealers and/or regional-only members whom his
clients wish to benefit for services unrelated to the transac-
tion."'
The SEC questioned the use of the customer-directed give-up to
reward broker-dealers who sold fund shares. In its view, "[a]lthough
the commissions are generated by fund portfolio transactions and are
paid by the funds, their use as extra compensation for sales of fund
shares benefits the adviser-underwriters and the retail sellers of fund
shares rather than fund shareholders."'" Since mutual fund advisers
are usually paid a percentage of the fund's net asset worth, increased
sales would increase their compensation. This, the SEC concluded,
" PPI, supra note 25, at 171 n.70. With the exception of the captive retailers in the
fully-integrated organization, all broker-dealers who sell mutual fund shares are members
of the NASD.
75 Id. at 171-72. For another example of how a regional exchange can be used to
distribute give-ups to nonexchange member broker-dealers, see SEC Institutional Investor
Study, supra note 58, at 2185-86.
76
 SEC, Report on the Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth,
H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.'172 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PPM See also
Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund Complexes, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 205, 252-53 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Glazer].
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may induce some advisers to turn over the fund's portfolio more often,
to allocate most of the brokerage for sales rather than for other ser-
vices which may be more valuable to the fund, such as research, and to
engage in other practices which would be detrimental to the fund's
shareholders?'
On a much broader level, the SEC also questioned whether the
extensive use of customer-directed give-ups did not "raise questions
as to the propriety of the [fixed minimum] commission rate schedule
itself."78 The Commission was of the opinion that, "[a]ssuming that
a minimum commission schedule is necessary and appropriate to effec-
tive and efficient operation of an exchange, the commission rate struc-
ture should be designed to compensate brokers fairly for the services
they perform and to provide equitable treatment for various classes
of customers whose use of exchange facilities is basically similar!'"
The willingness of brokers to give up a substantial part of their com-
missions indicated to the SEC that the existing minimum commission
rates might be too high.
In January, 1968, the SEC proposed to adopt Rule 10b-10 80 under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The proposed rule would have
prohibited an investment company manager from directing a broker-
dealer to give up any part of the commission on a securities transaction
for an investment company unless the benefits of the division of the
commission accrued to the investment company's shareholders. The
release also requested comments on an NYSE proposal to institute a
volume discount. Rule 10b-10 was never adopted by the SEC. The
NYSE, however, "voluntarily" amended its constitution to prohibit,
effective December 5, 1968, customer-directed give-ups," at the same
time instituting a volume discount. The American Stock Exchange and
77 PPI, supra note 76, at 172-82.
78
 Id. at 185. The SEC also considered that the use of reciprocal business practices
(i.e., channeling brokerage directly to those who sell fund shares) had an adverse effect
on mutual funds and their shareholders. Id. at 186. I. Friend, M. Blume, and J. Crockett,
Mutual Funds and Other Institutional Investors: A New Perspective 31 (1970).
79
 PPI, supra note 76, at 185.
99 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968), [1967-1969
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II 77,523.
81 See NYSE Const., Art. XV, 1, 2 CCH N.Y. Stock Exch. Guide 1701 (1971).
How "voluntary" the NYSE's action was has been the subject of dispute. In a suit
brought against the SEC by the Independent Broker-Dealers' Association, the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the SEC's "requests" to the
NYSE to abolish give-ups was "agency action" within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedure Act and that the district court had jurisdiction to determine whether such
agency action was ultra vires. The court, however, considered the merits and found that
the SEC's action was within its powers and therefore remanded the case and ordered
the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the SEC. Independent Broker-
Dealers' Ass'n v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 92 S. Ct.
63 (1971).
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all the regional stock exchanges contemporaneously abolished the give-
up and instituted a volume discount schedule.
H. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE USE
OF PORTFOLIO BROKERAGE FOR SALES
A. Abolition of the Customer-Directed Give-Up: the Aftermath
Although customer-directed give-ups have been abolished, mutual
fund managers still engage in reciprocal business practices in order to
reward those who sell the shares of their funds. 82 In addition to di-
rectly placing fund business with more broker-dealers, fund managers
have used increasingly more sophisticated reciprocal practices. For
example, as noted previously, fund portfolio business is placed with an
NYSE member for execution on that exchange "courtesy of" another
broker-dealer who is a member of a regional exchange. In return for
this business the NYSE member, who may also be a member of the
same regional exchange, will arrange an unrelated trade, usually in
dually listed stock, on the regional exchange." The NYSE-regional
exchange member will then "give up" the name of the designated
broker for purposes of execution and/or clearing duties. In practice,
however, "the duties are performed by the clearing house and the
member given-up does nothing beyond acquire a generally meaningless
`responsibility' for the trade."" Yet, the give-up recipient in many
cases is entitled to receive a substantial portion of the commission on
the trade." This arrangement is not classified as a prohibited give-up
because the executing and/or clearing broker supposedly has per-
formed a service entitling him to compensation. As a practical matter,
however, this arrangement differs little from the customer-directed
give-up which, in name at least, has been abolished."
The abolition of the customer-directed give-up has had a severe
impact on broker-dealers who are not members of any exchange. Prior
82
 In its recent report on the future structure of the securities markets, the SEC
proposed the prohibition of the use of reciprocal portfolio brokerage as a reward for sales.
SEC Policy Statement, The Future Structure of the Securities Markets, at 7 (Feb. 7,
1972). It has been suggested that it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to enforce
such a prohibition. See Wall Street Journal, Feb. 7, 1972, at 2 col. 3.
83 NYSE Const., Art. XIV, § 8, 2 CCH N.Y. Stock Exch. Guide g 1658 (1970),
allows an NYSE member to execute orders in listed securities on any other exchange so
long as the other exchange is not in New York.
84 Welles, The War Between the Big Board and the Regionals: What it Means to
the Business, Inst. Inv., Dec., 1970, at 26.
85 On the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange, the give-up recipient can receive an amount
equal to 40% of the nonmember commission. The amounts permitted on the Midwest
Stock Exchange and the Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Stock Exchange are 46.5%
and 50%, respectively. Id.
86 For an example of another interesting reciprocity technique known as the "mirror
trade," See SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 58, at 2185.
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to its abolition, some regional exchanges allowed their members to give
up commissions to nonmembers who belonged to the NASD; in this
way, a fund could provide those broker-dealers with compensation
for selling fund shares. Now, however, it would be an illegal rebate
under the rules of the various exchanges for a member to give up any
portion of the commission received to a nonmember. Moreover, since
a fund manager is under a duty to obtain "best execution" on the
fund's portfolio business," it is often not possible to direct fund busi-
ness to these broker-dealers." In reaction to this state of affairs, some
regional exchanges, no doubt at the behest of institutional investors,
have reduced the price on their "seats" in order to allow small NASD
members to join and thereby to participate in reciprocity practices."
In addition, attention has been directed to the sharp increase in use of
the secondary distribution method to move large blocks of stock." In a
secondary distribution an institution such as a mutual fund sells a
large block of stock through a group of broker-dealers who then retail
the stock to their customers. William J. Casey, Chairman of the SEC,
has indicated that there is "some concern that the secondary distribu-
tion may be a particularly amenable vehicle to reward retail firms that
merchandised significant amounts of the fund shares . . . since it per-
mits the inclusion of NASD-only members in the selling group." 9' This
concern derives from the fact that the cost to the seller (the fund) in
a secondary distribution is considerably higher than in a market trans-
action."
B. Introduction of the Volume Discount and Negotiated Rates
At the same time that the customer-directed give-up was abol-
ished all exchanges instituted a volume discount. On the NYSE, for
example, the commission rate schedule remains unchanged for trans-
actions up to and including 1,000 shares but that portion of a trans-
action which exceeds 1,000 shares is eligible for the volume discount."
87 See Delaware Management Co., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. if 77,458.
88 See discussion at pp. 970-972 supra.
89
 Welles, The War Between the Big Board and the Regionals: What it Means to the
Business, Inst. Inv., Dec., 1970, at 24,
90 Address by William J. Casey, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission,
before the Institutional Trading Conference, June 17, 1971, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78.141 at 80,463.
91 Id. at 80,464.
92
 The average cost to the vendor of the secondary distributions noted by the SEC
was 4 to 5% of the total value involved. Id. at 80,463. This is considerably higher than
the approximately 1% charged in a market transaction.
98 The NYSE minimum commission schedule, including the volume discount can be
found in NYSE Const., Art. XV, § 2(a) (1)-(2), 2 CCH N.Y. Stock Exch. Guide
1 1702 (1971). The SEC has determined to raise no objection at this time to a revised
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In effect, the volume discount lowers the commissions paid by a fund
on large transactions,' and lower commissions, of course, mean fewer
"soft dollars" available to reward fund sellers. Although volume dis-
count requirements theoretically could be skirted, the placing of a
fund order so as to avoid•the volume discount, in order to generate
more soft dollars with which to compensate fund sellers, could consti-
tute a breach of the fund manager's fiduciary duty to obtain "best
execution.""
Of more immediate concern to mutual funds and other institu-
tional investors is the effect that the recent introduction of competitive
commission rates will have on the amount of soft dollars available to
compensate for sales and other services. On October 22, 1970, in a
letter to the President of the NYSE commenting on a proposed NYSE
minimum-commission rate schedule submitted the previous June, the
SEC indicated its opinion that "fixed charges for portions of orders in
excess of $100, 000 are neither necessary nor appropriate!" 96 On Feb-
ruary 11, 1971, the SEC relented somewhat and indicated that it would
"not object to the . . . [NYSE's] commencing competitive rates on
portions of orders above a level not higher than $500,000 rather than
at the $100,000 figure mentioned in [the] October 22 letter."" Mem-
bers of the NYSE were informed that as of April 5, 1971, the Exchange
would not enforce its minimum commission rate schedule on that por-
tion of an order in excess of $500,000."
minimum commiggion rate schedule. SEC, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9351
(Oct. .5, 1971), [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,306 (1971).
94 Since the average mutual fund order on the NYSE in 1969 was 3,726 shares, see
note 68 supra, most funds realized some cost saving because of the volume discount.
95 This situation would be similar to that where a broker-dealer induces a customer
to purchase mutual fund shares at a price just below the breakpoint (otherwise the
customer may have been entitled to a discount on the sales load). It has been held that
this course of conduct was a violation of Rule 10(b)-5. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
in [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,651; Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
[1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,306. See also, CCH NASD
Manual 11 5266 (1971).
99 See SEC, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9007 (Oct. 22, 1970) in [.1970-1971
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,918 at 80,047.
97 SEC, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9079 (Feb. 11, 1971) in [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,955. In response to a letter from Rep.
John E. Moss (D-Cal.) inquiring as to the reason why the cutoff was raised from $100,000
to $500,000, SEC Commissioner Hugh F. Owens stated that "[w]hile the Commission
believes that the evidence for instituting competitive rates on institutional size orders is
ample and remains compelling, we have concluded that this goal might best be obtained
through a gradual phasing down to the $100,000 level." 96 BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep., Apr.
7, 1971, at N-3. For the text of Rep. Moss' letter to the SEC, see 95 BNA Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep., March 31, 1971, at G-1.
98 See Letter from NYSE President Robert W. Haack to all NYSE Members and
Allied Members, March 26, 1971 in 96 BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep., Apr. 7, 1971 at M-1.
The NYSE Constitution was formally amended to reflect the implementation of negotiated
rates on April 19, 1971. See NYSE Const., Art. XV, 2 in 2 CCH N.Y. Stock Exch.
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With the ceiling at $500,000 it is unlikely that many fund man-
agers will have to negotiate commissions since the dollar amounts of
most fund portfolio transactions involve significantly Less 92
 The
$500,000 ceiling, however, was merely a starting point. In its recent
statement on market structure the SEC informed the exchanges that,
effective in April, 1972, the ceiling would be lowered to $300,000. 100
In addition, Senator Harrison Williams has recently introduced legis-
lation which would prohibit, after December 31, 1973, any exchange
from enforcing or maintaining any rule fixing minimum commissions
on any portion of a transaction in excess of $100,000. 101 1f the ceiling
is lowered to $100,000, many more fund managers would find them-
selves negotiating commission rates on portions of large orders.142 In
most cases these negotiated rates would lower the total commission
paid for the execution of large fund orders and, as a consequence,
would lower the number of soft dollars available to reward fund
sellers."3
Fund managers may avoid this loss of soft dollars in a number of
ways—for example, by breaking up larger trades into pieces which
fall below the ceiling. In this way, the maximum number of soft dollars
will be generated. Use of this method, however, may cause the fund
manager to be sued on the ground, among others, that he failed to
obtain best execution for the fund."' A second method by which soft
Guide 1702 (1972). See also 98 BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep., Apr. 21, 1971, at A-12. For a
discussion of the impact of negotiated rates on the securities industry, see Welles, Living in
a World of Negotiated Rates: Who Will Prosper? Who Will Fail?, Inst. Inv., Jan., 1971
at 36.
ss The average mutual fund order on the NYSE in 1969 was 3,726 shares. See note
68 supra. If it is assumed that all of these orders involved stock trading at $40 per share
(in 1969, the average price of stock traded by institutions and intermediaries was $44
per share, SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 58, at 2167), then the average
mutual fund order would involve slightly more than $149,000.
100
 See SEC Statement, supra note 82, at 6. SEC Commissioner James Needham
indicated in a recent speech that he envisioned the ceiling being lowered to $100,000 and
eventually, fully negotiated commission rates. See Wall Street Journal, March 3, 1972, at
6, col. 2.
tot See, e.g., S. 3169, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See also Securities Industry Study:
Report of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
4 (Comm. Print, 1972).
102 It must be kept in mind that competitive commission rates apply only to that
portion of an order which is in excess of $500,000 (or $100,000 if lowered). Up to
$500,000, the fixed minimum commission must be charged.
108 For a discussion of the effect of competitive rates on mutual funds, see Welles,
Living in a World of Negotiated Rates: Who Will Prosper? Who Will Fail?, Inst. Inv.
Jan. 1971, at 40, 54-55.
104 It has been suggested, somewhat facetiously, that a fund manager could defend
such a suit by claiming that he had suddenly become a believer in the fantastic benefits
to be derived from dollar-cost averaging. Id. at 40. Dollar cost averaging is the practice of
buying fixed dollar amounts of securities at regular intervals regardless of price. For a
discussion of dollar cost averaging see Wiesenberger Services, Investment Companies
1969: Mutual Funds and Other Types 68-72.
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dollars may be maximized involves the fund manager's disposal of a
large block of a particular stock through a secondary offering, rather
than through a market transaction. 105 As noted, the SEC has expressed
some concern about the recent increase in the use of secondary offer-
ings.'"
C. The Duty of a Fund Manager to Recapture Brokerage
for the Fund
The previous discussion focused on the methods by which fund
managers use the fund's portfolio brokerage to reward those who sell
fund shares and on two developments which may result in less broker-
age being available for this purpose. Another recent development could
very well eliminate the use of portfolio brokerage to reward for sales.
In Moses v. Burgin,m the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
that the manager of a mutual fund has a duty to recapture fund
brokerage and that he cannot use it to reward broker-dealers for selling
fund shares.108 In finding such a duty, the court looked to the charter
of the fund in question, which required that the fund receive full net
asset value on the sale of its shares.'" The court noted that "[i]f Fund
receives the asset value of new shares, but at the same time rewards
the selling broker with give-ups that it has a right to recapture for
itself, then the net income Fund receives from the process of selling a
share is less than asset value."'" In so holding, the court specifically
rejected the contention that management has a right, in the exercise of
its business judgment, to choose between recapture of the fund's direct
benefit and the use of brokerage to increase sales for the fund's indirect
benefit."' Since the decision was based on facts which predated the
abolition of the customer-directed give-up, and since the mode of
recapture prescribed by the court (NASD recapture through a regional
exchange), is no longer available,'" the court's finding as regards
105 See text accompanying notes 90-92 supra.
100 Id.
107 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, sub. nom., Johnson v. Moses, 404
U.S. 994 (1971).
108 Id. at 374. See also Miller & Carlson, Recapture of Brokerage Commissions by
Mutual Funds, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 35 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Miller & Carlson];
Butowsky, Mutual Fund Brokerage, 3 Rev. of Sec. Reg. 915 (May 20, 1970).
10 Most fund charters prohibit the selling of fund shares at less than net asset
values. See Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. Pa, L. Rev. 179,
257 (1971).
110 445 F.2d at 374.
111 Id .
112 The court held that it was possible for the fund's underwriter, who was a
member of the NASD, to recapture brokerage on both the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange
(PCE) and the Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Stock Exchange (PBW). 445 F.2d at
380-81. Before the abolition of give-ups, it was possible for NASD members to receive
give-ups from members of most regional exchanges. The PCE and PBW, however,
979
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
liability would appear to be of limited value."' The decision, however,
at least implicitly imposes a significant duty on management to pre-
serve fund assets.
While recognizing a duty to recapture, the court specifically held
that a fund manager need not create or acquire a broker-dealer affiliate
for the purpose of recapturing brokerage if it determines, in the exer-
cise of its business judgment, that it would not be in the best interests
of the fund.'" If a broker-dealer affiliate is formed or acquired, how-
ever, there may be a duty to recapture. In the In re Provident Manage-
ment Corp. case,11 " the fund's manager directed fund portfolio orders
to a particular broker-dealer who was a member of the NYSE. In re-
turn, the broker-dealer would designate the fund's affiliate broker-
dealer, who was a member of the Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington
Exchange (PBW), as clearing broker on unrelated trades carried out
on that exchange. The affiliate would collect and retain a clearing
commission on the transaction. The SEC held that retention by the
affiliated broker-dealer of commissions received under this arrange-
ment violated the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
as well as section 17 (e) (1) of the 1940 Act.'" The Commission indi-
cated that "[i]t was improper for . . . [the affiliated broker-dealer]
to keep for itself rather than confer on the Fund the benefits attribu-
table to Fund's assets."'
allowed the NASD recipients to credit them against advisory fees. The other regional
exchanges allowed NASD members to receive give-ups but considered it a violation of
their anti-rebate rules if these give-ups were applied against the advisory fee. Id. No
exchange presently permits give-ups of any kind to nonmembers. See note 81, supra.
113
 In addition to finding that the fund managers failed in their duty to recapture,
the court found that they were guilty of gross misconduct under § 36 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36 (1964), for not disclosing to the unaffiliated
directors the possibilities of recapture. 445 F.2d at 385. Section 36 has been amended,
effective June 14, 1972. See Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 20, 84 Stat. 1413.
1114
 445 F.2d at 375. See also SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8746 (Nov.
10, 1969), [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,761 (Loomis Letter) ;
Miller & Carlson, supra note 108, at 50-53. The SEC's position with respect to institutional
membership, which would require that an institution affiliated broker-dealer do a
predominantly public business, would prevent many institutions from forming affiliates
for the purpose of recapture. See SEC Policy Statement, The Future Structure of the
Securities Markets 8-10 (Feb. 1972).
115 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,937.
110 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e) (1) (1970). This section makes it unlawful for any affiliated
person of a registered investment company, or an affiliated person of such person "acting
as agent, to accept from any source any compensation ... for the purchase or sale of any
property to or for such registered investment company . . . except in the course of such
person's business . . . as an underwriter or broker." For a discusssion of § 17(e) in the
context of mutual fund brokerage see Miller & Carlson, supra note 108, at 47-49, 53-55;
Butowsky, Mutual Fund Brokerage, 3 Rev. of Sec. Reg. 915 (May 20, 1970).
117
 Provident Management Corp. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. If 77,937 at 80,087. See also Consumer-Investing Planning Corp., [1967-1969
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,677.
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The In re Provident Management case does not hold that a
broker-dealer affiliate can never retain commissions received on fund
transactions. The case applies only to the situation in which the
affiliate does not perform a bona fide brokerage service. The SEC has
argued, however, that a fund-affiliated broker-dealer is under a duty to
recapture and credit to the fund commissions that it receives on fund
portfolio transactions. In Kurach v. Weissman' the SEC argued that
a proposed settlement agreement whereby the fund's broker-dealer
affiliate (also the fund's underwriter) would offset against the ad-
visory fee the net profits derived from the execution of the fund's
portfolio business was illusory. Its illusory nature results from the
fact that it "offers no benefits to Fund shareholders, which they are
not in any event entitled to receive . . . ."110  court rejected
this argument on the ground that Section 17(e) of the 1940 Act, at
least by clear implication, authorizes an affiliated broker-dealer to re-
ceive and presumably to retain compensation for buying or selling
property of any investment company, including portfolio securities,
in the course of its business as a broker.'" It would seem, then, that
a broker-dealer affiliate is permitted to receive and retain commissions
which it derives from acting as the fund's executing broker. 12 '
An issue somewhat related to recapture is whether a fund man-
ager violates section 17(e) by using fund portfolio brokerage as a
reward for fund sales. One commentator has suggested that if in-
creased fund sales are viewed as being of benefit only to the managers
in the form of a higher advisory fee, then the sale of fund shares can
only be viewed as "compensation" to the managers. Since the
brokerage was not derived in the course of their business as brokers,
their retention of it violates section 17(e). 122 The same writer also
argues that the underwriter exemption in section 17(e)(1) is not
available since the use of fund brokerage would create a "hidden sales
charge" in violation of section 22(d). 128 Another commentator, in
118
 49 F.R.D. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
in Id. at 307. The SEC made substantially the same argument in an amicus curiae
brief filed in the Second Circuit in opposition to a similar proposed settlement in the
case of Gross v. Moses. See 115 BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep., Aug. 18, 1971, at F-1.
120 49 F.R.D. at 307-08; Miller & Carlson, supra note 108, at 48.
121
 A broker-dealer affiliate can credit commission received on fund business against
the advisory fee only on those exchanges which do not consider such an arrangement
violative of their anti-rebate rules (e.g. Pacific Coast Stock Exchange). For an example
of one such arrangement, see Investors Mutual, Inc., Prospectus 5 (Jan. 13, 1971),
122 See Butowaky, Mutual Fund Brokerage 3 Rev. of Sec. Reg. 915, 919 (May 20,
1970).
123 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970). This section requires sales at the "current public
offering price described in the prospectus," which usually is net asset value plus a pre-
scribed sales load. Since portfolio brokerage is used as extra compensation, the current
offering price would be net asset value plus sales load plus brokerage expended on sales
efforts; hence the hidden sales charge.
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reply to the above argument, suggests that section 17(e) does not
reach, nor was it intended to reach, activities based upon the fund
directors' exercise of business judgment."' The SEC, he argues, can
only reach such activities under the "gross abuse of trust" standards
of section 36.125
 In light of the language in Moses v Burgin, it is not
certain whether the business judgment defense would be sufficient.'
D. Recommendations for a National Securities Market
On August 5, 1971, William McChesney Martin, former Chair-
man of the Federal Reserve Board, submitted a report on the se-
curities markets to the Board of Governors of the NYSE.' In his
report Mr. Martin advocated the retention, at least for the present,
of fixed-minimum commission rates and the formation of a national
securities exchange system which would include the present NYSE,
Amex, and the regional exchanges. All stock not listed on this na-
tional exchange would continue to be traded over the counter. This
national securities exchange would bar institutional membership and
would prohibit members from affiliating with mutual fund manage-
ment companies and from entering into fund management contracts.
In addition, the third market would be eliminated—i.e., securities
listed on the national exchange could not be traded over the counter.
Since the report does not specify the mechanics of the proposed
national securities exchange, the effect that it may have on the present
method of utilizing portfolio brokerage to reward for sales is difficult
to .assess. If, for example, all present members of any exchange (ex-
cept institutions) automatically become members of the new ex-
change, then the practice of splitting commissions among brokers will
probably continue. Thus a fund would place an order with member
broker A who would then send it to broker B for execution and pos-
sible clearing. Broker A would receive the full minimum commission,
paying broker B a floor brokerage and clearing fee. In this way the
fund could reward broker A for selling its shares and, since the fund
must pay a fixed minimum commission, there is no question of failure
to obtain best execution. There would also be no problem in regard
124
 See West, Mutual Fund Brokerage, 3 Rev, of Sec. Reg., 903, (June 19, 1970);
Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund .Complexes, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 205, 246-47 (1970)
(hereinafter cited as Glazer].
125 15 U.S.C. 80a-36 (1970). The gross abuse of trust standard has been changed.
Under new § 36(a), the SEC is authorized to bring an injunctive action against any of
the persons enumerated in that section, alleging that such person has or is about to
engage in any act or practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal
misconduct. Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 20, 84 Stat. 1413.
125 See text accompanying note 114 supra.
127 See excerpts of the report in N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1971, at 47, col. 3. The Mar-
tin Report has been sharply criticized. See, e.g., Farrar, The Martin Report: Wall Street's
"Great Leap Backward," Financial Analysts J., (Sept.-Oct., 1971).
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to the duty to recapture since the national securities exchange as
proposed would prohibit membership of a fund-affiliated broker-
dealer.
The SEC itself has also called for a "Central Market System" in
listed securities which would encompass the present exchanges as well
as the third market. 128 In the SEC's view, such a system is necessary
n order to maximize the depth and liquidity of our markets, so
that securities can be bought and sold at reasonably continuous and
stable prices, and to ensure that each investor will receive the best
possible execution of his order. . . ."129 The possible effects that the
Central Market System envisioned by the SEC or the national ex-
change proposed by Mr. Martin might have on the use of portfolio
to reward sales will be better assessed after more specific recommenda-
tions regarding the mechanics of such an exchange are made avail-
able.'"
IV. POSSIBLE SOURCES OF ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION FOR
THOSE WHO SELL FUND SHARES
The use of fund portfolio brokerage as a reward for sales has
already been affected by abolition of the customer-directed give-up
and introduction of the volume discount.'" Moreover, there is a good
chance that one or another of the developments discussed previously
will have an adverse impact on this use of portfolio brokerage. If the
use of portfolio brokerage as a reward for sales will be restricted in
the future, the question arises: how will funds continue to induce
broker-dealers to sell their shares?'"
A. Increase of the Sales Load
The first and most obvious way to provide additional compensa-
tion to those who sell fund shares is to raise the sales load and give
the selling broker-dealer a higher selling concession. Such an increase,
however, would be contrary to the expressed desire of the SEC to see
the sales load reduced. In 1966, the SEC recommended that the 1940
Act be amended to prohibit a sales load exceeding five percent of the
128 See SEC Policy Statement, The Future Structure of the Securities Markets 2-3
(Feb. 1972).
129 Id. at 2.
139 Since it has been determined that the use of reciprocal brokerages for sales should
be prohibited, see note 81 supra, the SEC will likely require that any national securities
system be designed so as to make its use difficult, if not impossible.
131 See text accompanying notes 86-106 supra.
182 The discussion here is limited to the semi - and non-integrated organizations since
they utilize independent broker-dealers to sell their shares. Fully integrated organizations
like IDS do not use portfolio brokerage as a reward for sales since they sell through a
captive retail sales force. See note 32 supra.
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net asset value of the shares sold. 1" The SEC recommendation was
based on a finding that the typical sales load charged (8.5 percent of
purchase price or 9.3 percent of the amount actually invested after
deduction of the sales load) was far in excess of the charges involved
in other securities transactions.'" For example, the typical sales charge
on a $200 investment in mutual fund shares was forty percent higher
than the round-trip cost of purchasing and selling shares of equal
value in the exchange market.1" The SEC argued that the high level
of the sales load resulted because Section 22(d) of the 1940 Act,'" the
so-called 'resale price maintenance provision, prevented competition
in the area of the sales load and in fact served to increase the load as
fund underwriters sought to induce dealers to sell their shares.
In the course of discussions with the mutual fund industry, the
SEC decided to abandon its recommendation for the five percent
ceiling in favor of an industry proposal recommending that the test
under Section 22 (b) of the 1940 Act for evaluating the reasonableness
of the sales load be changed from one prohibiting "unconscionable or
grossly excessive" sales loads' to one prohibiting "excessive sales
loads."18s The Investment Company Amendments Act of 19701"
incorporated this proposal and now Section 22 (b) urges that the NASD
shall make rules to provide that "the price at which such [redeemable]
security is offered or sold to the public shall not include an excessive
sales load but shall allow for reasonable compensation for sales person-
nel, broker-dealers, and underwriters, and for reasonable sales loads
to investors."'" Under the amended statute, the SEC has the final
authority to determine what constitutes an excessive sales load.'"
188
 See PH, supra note 76, at 223. For an analysis of this proposal see, University
of Pennsylvania, Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 659, 769-807 (1967).
189 SEC, Report on the Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth,
H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 209-15 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PPI].
135
 Id. at 211. For an investment of $1,120, an amount just below the median net
mutual fund purchase, the typical sales load charged was more than 2% times the cost of
round-trip on the same size investment on a stock exchange. Id.
138
 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970). This section makes it unlawful for any issuer,
underwriter or dealer to sell any redeemable security at anything other than the "current
public offering price described in the prospectus." This price is usually the net asset value
of the share plus the prescribed sales load as described in the prospectus. No-load funds,
of course, sell their shares to the public at net asset value without a sales load.
131 Investment Company Act of 1940, § 22(b), ch. 686, tit. I, § 22, 54 Stat. 823.
138 See Hearings on H.R. 11995, S. 2224, H.R. 13754 & H.R. 14737 Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 865 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 House Hearings].
130 Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413.
140 Id. § 12 (a), 84 Stat. at 1422.
141 The amendment provides that the NASD, within IS months from the date of
enactment of the 1970 amendments, is to adopt rules with respect to excessive sales
loads. At any time after 18 months or after the NASD adopts the rules, whichever is
sooner, the SEC may alter or supplement such rules in conformity with the procedures
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A determination of what constitutes reasonable compensation
must be balanced against the reasonableness of the sales load from the
investor's point of view. Since the SEC views the use of portfolio
brokerage to reward sellers of fund shares as providing little or no
value to fund shareholders,'" the loss of the use of brokerage for this
purpose would not likely be sufficient reason to raise the sales load.
In fact, it may not even be sufficient justification for maintaining
existing sales load levels. There exist some indications that, in amend-
ing section 22 (b), Congress expected that sales loads would be re-
duced. First, the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, in its
report on the bill that ultimately became law, cited the differences in
transaction costs (the basis for the SEC's original recommendation
that a five percent ceiling be imposed) as one reason why section 22 (b)
should be amended to prohibit "excessive sales loads." 143
 Second, and
perhaps more important, was the specific congressional command to
the SEC that smaller companies be granted qualified exemptions from
amended section 22 (b), if it appears that such companies are subject
to higher operating costs."' It seems that Congress was concerned that
if the sales load were to be reduced, smaller companies would be unable
to compensate adequately those involved in the distribution process and
that therefore they would be unable to compete with larger companies.
Any other view of the congressional mandate to the SEC would make
little sense, especially in light of the fact that the SEC has far reach-
ing but discretionary exemptive authority under Section 6(c) of the
1940 Ace"
B. Adviser Subsidization of the Distribution Process
A second method to provide additional compensation to those
who sell fund shares is to allow the retail broker-dealer a higher con-
set out in § 15A(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k)(2)
(1970). The 18 months was included to give the NASD sufficient time to study the sales
load question before adopting rules, It is likely that the NASD will require the entire
18 months since the SEC considers that their study should cover more than the sales
load question. See 96 BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep., Apr. 4, 1971 at A-10, A-11.
142 PPI, supra note 134, at 185. In fact, the SEC has argued that extensive use of
reciprocals and give-ups to reward for fund sales may have a detrimental effect on fund
purchasers. Id. at 179-80.
143 See S. Rep. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969). The commission rate
schedule which existed in 1966 when the SEC's recommendation was made still exists for
the most part. In 1968 the NYSE instituted a volume discount which lowered the com-
mission rates on that portion of an order which exceeds 1,000 shares. See NYSE Const.,
Art. XV § 2(a), 2 CCU N.Y. Stock Exch. Guide II 1702 (1972). On June 30, 1971, the
NYSE presented a revised commission rate schedule for SEC consideration, and in Sep-
tember, the SEC indicated that it would raise no objection to the new schedule. See note
93 supra.
144 Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 12(a), 84 Stat. 1422.
242 15 U.S.C.$ 80a-6(c) (1970).
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cession out of the existing sales load. As noted previously,'" a retail
broker-dealer may retain from six to eight percent of the typical sales
load (8.5 percent) charged by funds. From this amount the dealer
must pay for overhead and other expenses as well as compensate the
salesman who actually sold the fund shares. The remaining 0.5 to 2.5
percent is retained by the fund's underwriter, who is usually also the
fund's adviser or one affiliated with the adviser. 147
In order to induce a broker-dealer to continue to sell its shares,
if portfolio brokerage is no longer available for this purpose, an under-
writer may have to raise the dealer's concession from, for example,
6 percent to 7.5 or 8 percent.'" This increase may induce the retail
dealer to continue to sell fund shares but it will also reduce the amount
of the sales load retained by the underwriter who normally incurs,
in addition to overhead expenses, other promotional expenses for ad-
vertising and the dissemination to dealers of sales material to be used
in the selling of fund shares. As it is, the underwriter function may
carry a low profit margin and may even operate at a loss?" If under-
writing income is further reduced because less of the sales load is re-
tained, the fund adviser may be forced to subsidize the distribution
process. Some advisers will be willing to provide the subsidy in the
hopes that continued sales of fund shares will increase the fund's net
assets and, consequently, the amount of the advisory fee that they re-
ceive.m Others, however, may pass the cost of this subsidization to
fund shareholders in the form of a higher management fee. In such a
case, the adviser subsidy would be, in effect, a riskless expenditure
and, in fact, could lead to higher profits for the adviser if fund assets
do increase because, in addition to the higher fee rate, there would be
increased assets to which it would be applied.
An increase in the management fee for the purpose of subsidizing
the underwriting function" is not likely to go unchallenged by the
146 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
147 E.g., one underwriter, Dreyfus & Co., distributes all but 0.5% of the sales load
to the retail dealer. This is because the underwriter is also the fund's principal broker
and no portfolio brokerage is used to reward sellers of fund shares. SEC, Report of Spe-
cial Study of Security Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 218 (1963) [here-
inafter cited as Special Study].
148 In 1966 it was found that since 1950, the principal underwriters of 18 of the
28 dealer-distributed funds surveyed had raised the concession allotted to retail dealers.
See PPI, supra note 134, at 208-09.
140 For the years 1961-65, of 10 adviser-underwriters surveyed, 4 had lost money an
the underwriting aspect of their operations. The median profit for the 10 adviser-under-
writers surveyed was 8.7% of total income. PPI, supra note 134, at 122, 123 (table 111-8).
150 Id. at 125.
181 Discussion here is limited to load funds since most no-load funds do not utilize
an underwriter to distribute their shares. Rather, shares are said directly to the public
by mail or by broker-dealers who are rewarded with the fund's portfolio business. See PPI,
supra note 134, at 165. Moreover, many no-Ioad funds are sponsored by well-established
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SEC' 52
 or a fund shareholder. Under Section 35 (b), which was added
by the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970," a fund's
investment adviser "shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with
respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of
material nature, paid by . . . [the fund] . . . or by the security
holders thereof, to . . . [the] adviser, or any affiliated person of
. . . [the] adviser."'" Section 35(b) was added primarily to ease the
difficulty plaintiffs faced in challenging the level of management
fees.' 55
 In order to obtain relief, a plaintiff had to establish the existence
of "corporate waste," or that the fee amounted to gross misconduct or
gross abuse of trust on the part of the fund's adviser or directors, de-
pending on whether the fee was challenged under state law' or old
Section 36 of the 1940 Act."' In addition to requiring proof of waste
or gross misconduct, the courts placed great emphasis on the fact of
unaffiliated director and/or shareholder ratification of the manage-
ment contract." Under new section 35(b), however, the "ultimate
test, even if the compensation or payments are approved by the di-
rectors and share-holders, will not be whether it involves 'waste' of
corporate assets but will be whether the investment adviser has ful-
filled his fiduciary duty to the mutual fund shareholders in deter-
mining the fee." 155
In a suit under new section 35(b), an adviser would probably
argue that an increased fee to subsidize the underwriting function is
justified by the benefits accruing to fund shareholders because of in-
creased sales' and by noting that it was the business judgment of
the fund directors, including the unaffiliated directors, that the sale
brokerage houses or investment counseling firms as a service to their customers. In the
case of the brokerage house sponsor, it usually has a form of captive sales force in its
registered representatives.
102
 Former SEC Chairman Hamer Budge, in testimony given before the Subcomm. on
Finance and Commerce on the then pending Investment Company Amendments Act
stated "that the fact that a fund underwriter loses money in its distribution activities
does not permit an affiliated investment adviser to charge a higher management fee." 1969
House Hearings, supra note 138, at 178.
in Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 20, 84 Stat. 1429. This section be-
comes effective on June 14, 1972. Id. 30(4).
154 Id,
	 20.
155 See S. Rep. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969); H.R. Rep. No. 91-1382,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1969).
150 See, e.g., Saxe v. Brady, 40 Dcl. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (1962).
157
 Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963). For a discussion of
management fee litigation before the 1970 amendments see PPI, supra note 134, at 132-43.
168 See, e.g., Saxe v. Brady, 40 Dcl. Ch. 474, 486, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (1962).
169 S. Rep. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1969).
100 Although the benefit of increased sales in regard to the investment adviser is
clear, the benefits to fund shareholders are not. See Glazer, supra note 124, at 252-58.
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of fund shares should be encouraged."' In Moses v. Burgin, 162 the
court indicated that there may be situations where the fund's board of
directors has no choice, irrespective of their business judgment.' The
question of whether a court would find in a particular case that an
increase in the management fee for the purpose of selling more fund
shares constitutes a breach of the adviser's fiduciary duty to the fund
shareholders would depend upon the facts developed in the case. The
purpose of this discussion is simply to point out that it is highly ques-
tionable whether an adviser can pass the subsidization of the under-
writing function on to fund shareholders in the form of a higher
management fee.
C. Fund Assets
Another method of subsidizing the underwriting function, in the
event that the dealer concession is raised to induce continued sales,
involves the use of fund assets to pay promotional expenses otherwise
borne by the principal underwriter.'" There exists some question,
however, as to whether fund assets are a proper source for financing
the promotion of fund sales."
Under Section 10(a) of the 1940 Act,' 68 at least forty percent of
the members of a fund's board of directors must not be persons
affiliated with the fund's investment adviser."' Section 10(d), how-
ever, provides that if certain specified conditions are satisfied, a fund
may have a board of directors all members of which, except one, may
be persons affiliated with the fund's investment adviser. 188 Among the
161 One Senate report specifically noted that new section 35(b) "is not intended to
authorize a court to substitute its business judgment for that of the mutual fund's board
of directors in the area of management fees. It does, however, authorize the court to
determine whether the investment adviser has committed a breach of fiduciary duty in
determining or receiving the fee." S. Rep. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1969).
182 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971).
168
 Id. at 374.
164 A more direct approach would be to pay the underwriter a. fee based on the
value of shares sold. The underwriter might then distribute part of the fee, under a pre-
arranged schedule, to those dealers who sell fund shares. See Conference, supra note 133 at
780-71 (remarks of Gordon Henderson, Esq.).
165
 On the question of whether fund assets are a proper source for the financing of
mutual fund advertising, compare the remarks of Gordon Henderson, Esq., id., with
those of Herbert R. Anderson, Chairman of Group Securities, Inc., id. at 778.
188 15 U.S.C. 9 80a-10(a) (1970). After December 14, 1971, at least 40% of the
directors must not be "interested persons" rather than affiliated persons. See Act of Dec.
14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 5(a), 84 Stat. 1413. For a definition of "interested
person," see, id. § 2(a)(3).
te't See generally Glazer, supra note 124 at 233-35; Mundheim, Some Thoughts on
the Duties and Responsibilities of Unaffiliated Directors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1058 .(1967).
188
 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(d) (1970). This exemption from the 40% requirement was
for the benefit of existing investment advisers who wished to make the fund medium
available to their smaller customers. See H.R. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 14
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specified conditions are that no sales load be charged on the sale of
the fund's shares') and that "no sales or promotional expenses are in-
curred by [the fund]." 1" This is not to say that a no-load fund cannot
use fund assets to pay promotional expenses. Only those no-load
funds which utilize the section 10(d) exemption to avoid the forty
percent unaffiliated director requirement of section 10(a) are spe-
cifically restricted. 171
 It appears that Congress determined that in a
case where a sufficient number of unaffiliated directors (at least forty
percent of the board members) was lacking on a fund's board to safe-
guard fund assets, limitations on the use of those assets were re-
quired.'"
The fact that the Investment Company Act does not specifically
prohibit load funds, and those no-load funds meeting the requirements
of section 10(a), from using fund assets to pay promotional expenses
does not necessarily mean that a fund's adviser is free to use them for
any promotional purposes. Use of fund assets to pay for the printing
and distribution of the fund's prospectus or annual shareholder's re-
port, both of which can be considered promotional in nature, is not the
same as use of fund assets to pay for advertising copy or supplementary
sales material to be used in selling fund shares. In the former case the
documents are required to be delivered to investors and shareholders,'"
while in the latter case, the sole purpose is to aid the sale of additional
fund shares.
In the case of load funds, Congress has evidenced its intent that
the sales load be used to pay for sales and promotional expenses. Sec-
tion 2(a) (35) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 defines the
term "sales load" to mean "the difference between the price of a
security to the public and that portion of the proceeds from its sale
which is received . . . by the issuer . . . less any portion of such
difference deducted for trustee's or custodian's fees, insurance pre-
miums, issue taxes or administrative expenses or fees which are not
(1940). This section has also been amended to substitute "interested person" for "affili-
ated person." Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 5(a), 84 Stat. 1413.
too Investment Company Act of 1940 § 10 (d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(d) (3) (1970).
ITO Id. II .
 80a-10(d) (5) (1970). Expenses incurred in complying with laws regulat-
ing the issue and sale of fund shares are not considered sales or promotional expenses. Id.
int The promotional expenses of most, if not all, no-Ioad funds are, however, borne
by the fund's investment adviser which, in many cases, is primarily in the brokerage
and/or money management business and sponsors a no-load fund as a service to its cus-
tomers. See Conference, supra note 133, at 781 (remarks of Herbert R. Anderson).
172 See H.R. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 14 (1940).
178 Section 5(b) (2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
	 77e(b) (2) (1970)
requires that a prospectus either precede or accompany any security, including mutual
fund shares, carded through the mails or in interstate commerce. Section 29(d) of the
Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(d) (1970) requires a fund to distribute
semi-annual reports containing specified information to its shareholders.
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properly chargeable to sales or promotional activities.' 174 This defi-
nition, however, makes clear only that the sales load is to be used to
pay promotional expenses; it does not dictate that the sales load be
the only source for such payments. If the latter had been the intent of
Congress, presumably Congress would have so indicated as it did in
section 10(d) (5). Use of fund assets to pay for promotional expenses
may, however, run afoul of new section 35 (b), which imposes on a
fund's adviser a fiduciary duty with respect to compensation for ser-
vices or payments of a material nature received from the fund.'" It
is arguable that the increased fund sales resulting from promotional
activities paid for directly or indirectly by the fund is a form of pay-
ment to the fund's adviser.1" Since little or no benefit accrues to the
fund shareholders from the increased sales, the adviser's receipt of
such payments may constitute a breach of his fiduciary duty to
fund shareholders.'"
In order for this argument to be successful, it must be proved that
the increased sales generated, at least in part, by fund assets are of
little or no benefit to fund shareholders.'" Moreover, it could be
argued by fund managers that increased sales do in fact benefit fund
shareholders, albeit indirectly." 9 For example, managers contend that
a continual cash inflow through the sale of new shares and the rein-
vestment of dividend and capital gains distributions by existing share-
174
 15 U.S.C. tf 80a-2(a)(35) (1970).
175
 Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 20, 84 Stat. 1429.
178
 Payment is the form of a higher management fee received by the adviser due to
the increased sales. Since the typical fee arrangement is based on a fixed or sliding per-
centage of the fund's net assets, the gross fees received by the adviser will be increased to
the extent that there are net sales of fund shares. If fund assets pay part or all of the
cost of generating these increased sales, the adviser is receiving payment of a material
nature to the extent that it derives the sole benefit from this use of fund assets. At least
one commentator would presumably consider this to be compensation to the adviser. See
Butowsky, Mutual Fund Brokerage, 3 Rev. of Sec. Reg. 915, 919 (May 20, 1970).
177
 In § 1(b)(2) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (2)
(1970), Congress declared that the public interest is adversely affected "when investment
companies are .. operated ... [and] managed . . . in the interest of directors, officers,
investment advisers . . . or other affiliated persons thereof „ rather than in the in-
terest of all classes of such companies' security holders." It has been held that the
declarations contained in { 1(b) are a codification of the fiduciary obligations placed on
the officers, directors and advisers of investment companies. See Aldred Investment Trust
v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946). For a discussion
of the fiduciary obligations imposed by the Investment Company Act, see Greene,
Fiduciary Standards of Conduct Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 28 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 266 (1959).
178 New § 35(b)(1) places the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty on
the plaintiff. Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 20, 84 Stat. 1429.
179 Fund shareholders could possibly benefit directly through a scaled-down man-
agement fee. Whether the decrease in the cost of management to the individual investor
would offset his proportionate loss because of the use of fund assets as compensation for
sales depends on how the management fee is scaled down.
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holders is beneficial to the fund since management is then not forced
to liquidate portfolio securities for the purpose of meeting redemp-
tions.18° One fund manager, moreover, has claimed that, under some
circumstances, positive cash inflow results in better fund perfor-
mance,'" an obvious benefit to fund shareholders. A further benefit
cited is that as a fund grows, it is more likely to attract a higher caliber
of personnel for purposes of research and analysis as well as port-
folio management, thus providing better management services to the
fund.182
 Similarly, as a fund grows, it achieves economies of scale, 188
that is, lower operating costs per dollar of assets managed, which can
be passed on to fund shareholders in the form of scaled-down man-
agement fees. 18" It should be noted that, although fund growth may be
186
 See Practising Law Institute, Mutual Funds 145-57 (Transcript series 1970)
(remarks of Mr. Rotberg) [hereinafter cited as Mutual Funds]. This argument is bol-
stered somewhat by the recent net redemption experience. See note 2 supra. It should,
however, be noted that the recent net redemption experience was the first such occur-
rence for the mutual fund industry as a whole in over 30 years of its recorded history.
See Stovall, Why Fund Redemptions May be Bullish, Forbes, July 15, 1971, at 77.
181
 Robert L. Sprinkel and Richard E. Boesel who are, respectively, the Chairman
and President of Competitive Capital Fund, claim that "if a fund has a positive or nega-
tive cash flow of 10 per cent there is little effect on its performance, but when you get
up to a 30 per cent positive cash flow, there is definite positive effect on performance."
Fiske, The In-House Performance Derby: Competitive Capital, Inst. Inv., Jan. 1969 at
42, 46. The Institutional Investor Study found that there was indeed a positive relation-
ship between positive cash inflow (i.e., net sales) and performance. Because of limita-
tions on the data used, however, the Study could not state whether the positive cash
inflow preceded better performance or followed it. H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., 331 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC Institutional Investor Study]. The Wharton
Report found that on a cumulative basis, better performance was related to increased
inflow. H.R. Rep. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2c1 Sess. 343-44 (1962) [hereinafter cited as the
Wharton Report]. There is no quantitative evidence the positive cash inflow results in
better performance. See Mutual Funds, supra note 180 at 147 (remarks of Mr. Meyer).
See generally, Finefrock, Mutual Fund Cash Flow, Fundscope, Sept,, 1971, at 27.
182 See Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund Complexes, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 205, 253
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Glazer].
188
 For a discussion of economies of size see PPI, supra note 134, at 94-96.
184 In 1962, the Wharton Report concluded that "advisory fee rates charged open-
end companies by investment advisers are both significantly higher and significantly less
responsive to changes in the volume of assets supervised than is the case with other client
assets managed by these advisers or with open-end company assets managed internally
by boards of directors or trustees." Wharton Report, supra note 181, at 491. In its 1966
report, the SEC noted that management fees in many cases were reduced since the
Wharton Report. It noted, however, that the fees charged by advisers to many of the
larger funds still did not reflect economies of size. PPI, supra note 134, at 102. The In-
stitutional Investor Study found that
economies of scale exist for all types of accounts and that some savings are
being passed along to the investor via lower advisory fees for larger accounts.
The results show, however, that substantially greater reductions in fee ratios
[1969 advisory fee divided by total account assets as of Sept. 30, 1969, with the
result expressed as a percentage] exist for institutional, corporate and individual
accounts.
Institutional Investor Study, supra note 181, at 210. For an example of a scaled-down
management fee, see Fidelity Capital Fund, Inc., Prospectus 3 (March 31, 1970).
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beneficial to fund shareholders in the ways described above, most
studies have shown that there is no significant relationship between
the size of a fund and its performance.' 86 In fact, various commenta-
tors have noted that the larger a fund gets, the more difficult it be-
comes to maintain investment flexibility, which in turn may result in
poorer overall management performance.'" Some funds have in fact
set limitations on their asset size.'"
The foregoing discussion briefly indicates the difficulties which
the SEC or a private plaintiff suing under new section 35(b) may en-
counter in proving that increased fund sales compensated in part with
fund assets are of little or no benefit to fund shareholders. There
exists another argument, however, which may assist a plaintiff to
avoid this problem. In Moses v. Burgin, 188 the court held that fund
management could not use a fund asset, (recapturable fund brokerage),
for the purpose of selling fund shares.'" Chief Judge Aldrich based
this ruling on the fund's charter, which required that the fund receive
the net asset value on the sale of a fund share. The use of portfolio
brokerage which could be recaptured to sell more fund shares, he
reasoned, resulted in the fund's receipt of less than net asset value in
the process of selling a share and also resulted in a dilution of existing
shareholder interests in the fund.'" •The fact that in the fund man-
ager's business judgment increased sales were of indirect benefit to the
fund was, according to Judge Aldrich, irrelevant in light of the fund's
charter.'" The use of fund assets to promote the sale of fund shares
is no less a dilution of the interests of existing fund shareholders since
the latter bear part of the cost of selling new shares, a cost which
supposedly is to be borne, at least in the case of load funds, by the
new shareholders.'"
186 See SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 181, at 331; I. Friend, M.
Blume & J. Crockett, Mutual Funds and Other Institutional Investors: A New Perspec-
tive 60 (1970).
188 For a discussion of some of the problems involved in running a large fund, see
Mattlin, The Problems of Being the Enterprise Fund, Inst. Inv. March, 1970, at 25;
Glazer, supra note 182, at 254-55:
187 One fund's prospectus reads: "The management of the Fund believes that at-
tainment of its objectives will be aided by limiting its size. Accordingly, 30 days after the
day when total net assets of the Fund reach $150,000,000 the Fund will not without
shareholder approval issue or sell additional shares except to existing shareholders .
and as stock dividends and in capital gains distributions. See Keystone Apollo Fund, Inc.,
Prospectus 4-5 (Nov. 25, 1969).
188 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971).
186 Id. at 374.
160 Id.
161
 Id. The management defendants had argued that even if brokerage was recap-
turable "the directors still had a right to choose between recapture of the give-ups for
Fund's direct benefit, and awarding them to brokers for its indirect benefit." Id. The
court held, however, that if recapture was possible, "the directors had no such choice." Id.
162 Former SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen stated that the.reason 9 10(d)(5) of
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The fact that there exists no charter provision of the type de-
scribed in Moses does not foreclose the argument. Rule 22 c-1(a)
under the 1940 Act provides that "[no] registered investment com-
pany issuing any redeemable security, no person designated in such
issuer's prospectus as authorized to consummate transactions in any
such security, and no principal underwriter of, or dealer in, any such
security shall sell . . . any such security except at a price based on
the current net asset value of such security . . . ."'" In adopting
this rule the SEC stated that the purpose was "to eliminate or reduce
so far as reasonably practicable any dilution of the value of out-
standing redeemable securities of registered investment companies
through . . . the sale of such securities at a price below their current
net asset value . . . ."'94 Arguably, the fund receives less than the
current net asset value of the sale of new shares, in violation of Rule
22 c-1 (a), to the extent that the assets of the fund are used to obtain
these shares. It is unpredictable whether in such a case a court would
hold, as the court did in Moses v. Burgin, that fund managers have no
choice between using fund assets to promote sales, despite their
alleged benefit to the fund, and maintaining fund assets. Another
argument against the use of fund assets to pay for advertising can be
raised on the ground that this use would nullify to a great extent the
congressional view that investors be charged a "reasonable sales load."
If the present sales load levels were reduced but fund managers were
allowed to use fund assets to pay for sales, the net effect on investors
in many cases would be no change; they would continue to pay at the
sale levels. However, this would seem to be contrary to the spirit, if
not the letter of section 22(b) as amended in 1970. Moreover, where a
fund's prospectus sets forth a percentage sales load but fails to dis-
close that fund assets are used to pay for advertising, it would seem
that the fund has failed to state a material fact and that what was
stated in the prospectus was a misrepresentation to prospective share-
holders. As the foregoing discussion shows, a fund adviser who uses
the Investment Company Act, which prohibits certain funds from using fund assets to
pay promotional expenses, was passed was that "to the extent that . . . [funds] became
more aggressive and they used the assets of the fund, this would be a fee paid by existing
shareholders, who have very little interest or concern with whether or not other people
come into the fund. . . .
Ulf you should impose that charge on the fund itself, you may be asking people
who bought 10 years ago, 5 years ago, 3 years ago, to pay the part of the promotion
for the benefit of the investment adviser to bring other people into the fund." Hearings
on H.R. 9510 and H.R. 9511 Before a Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 716 (1967) [herein-
after cited as 1967 Hearings].
103 17 C.F.R.	 270.22c-1(a) (1971).
104 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5519 (Oct. 16, 1968), [1967-1969
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. It 77,616.
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fund assets to pay for promotional activities designed to sell more
shares runs a very high risk of being sued by the SEC or by fund
shareholders. This is especially true in light of the First Circuit's
opinion in Moses v. Burgin.
V. ADVERTISING AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF MUTUAL FUND SHARES
The purpose of the foregoing discussion was to indicate that the
compensation received by various participants in the mutual fund
distribution process has been adversely affected by past events such
as the abolition of the customer-directed give-up 195 and, more impor-
tant, that it may be further affected by future events, such as the
lowering of the competitive commission rate ceiling or the establish-
ment of a proposed national securities exchange.'"° The precise im-
pact which a further decrease in the level of compensation would have
depends, of course, on the extent of the decrease. Testimony before
Congress in 1967 in opposition to the SEC's proposal to impose a five
percent ceiling on the sales load provides an indication as to what effect
a substantial decrease might have. In their testimony, representatives
of the NASD noted the results of a 1966 survey among a random
sample of 2,400 NASD members. The survey showed that if the SEC's
proposals, including the five percent ceiling and the abolition of the
customer-directed give-up, had been in effect in 1966, then (a) three
out of five NASD members responding to the survey would have
operated at a loss; (b) of the firms which had gross income of less than
$100,000, seven out of ten would have operated at a loss; and (c) of
those firms which derived seventy percent or more of their income
from the sale of mutual fund shares, four out of five would have
ItN5
 Raymond W. Cocchi, President of the Independent Broker-Dealers Association,
which, in 1969, had 391 members whose primary source of income was the sale of mutual
fund shares, stated that the NYSE's abolition of the customer-directed give-up had
"shut us out from a significant part of our income. . ." See, i.e., the Hearings on
H.R. 1195, S. 2224, H.R. 13754 and H.R. 14737 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce
and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 549 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 House Hearings]. See also, Letter from Ken-
neth H. Sayre, Chairman of the NASD, in response to a letter from Congressman Hastings
Keith, requesting information on the impact of the abolition of give-ups on members of
the NASD. Id. at 427. The Institutional Investor Study found that the abolition of
customer directed give-ups resulted in a $15.7 million loss of income to the NYSE firms
which were surveyed and which were formerly the recipients of give-ups. SEC Institu-
tional Investor Study, supra note 181, at 2205-06.
190 The possibility that the present level of sales loads will be reduced cannot be
discounted. Although spokesmen for the SEC have stated that the Commission has no
preconceived notions as to what the NASD should recommend in the sales load area, the
fact remains that the basis for the SEC's original recommendation that a 5% ceiling be
imposed, i.e., the differences in transaction costs, has not changed. See 1969 House Hear-
ings, supra note 195, at 917-24.
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operated at a loss in 1966. 181 It is important to note that these figures
did not include members who, although maintaining a profitable busi-
ness, would have suffered a substantial reduction in profit. 1" In addi-
tion to these findings, the survey showed that if the five percent ceil-
ing had been in effect in 1966 the net income, after taxes, for all the
firms responding to the survey would have been reduced by 22.7 per-
cent. It is not suggested that such drastic results would follow any
reduction in present compensation levels. The survey does, however, sug-
gest that any reduction in the current levels will affect the profitability
of independent broker-dealers, especially those who engage primarily
in the business of retailing mutual fund shares.'"
Any further reduction, however slight, will have the greatest
impact on the mutual fund salesman. Typically, a beginning sales-
man for a firm specializing in mutual funds receives from forty to
fifty percent of the sales load charged the investor. In some cases this
percentage increases to approximately sixty percent as the salesman's
total sales increase.'" Thus, if a salesman who has reached the top
level of the compensation ladder (i.e. one who receives sixty percent
of the sales load) sells $2,000 worth of the shares of a fund that
charges the typical 8.5 percent sales load, he will receive as his
commission approximately $120. 2" It must be noted, however, that,
unlike a registered representative for a brokerage house who receives
a portion of the commissions generated whenever one of his cus-
tomers turns over his account, the mutual fund salesman receives only
one commission. Of course, if he sells more shares to his existing cus-
tomers, he will receive a commission on those sales. But for the most
tor For the complete text of the NASD's presentation, see, 1967 Hearings, supra
note 192, at 316-24.
108
 The net income of 101 responding firms whose gross income was less than
$100,000 would have been reduced by some 180%. Seventeen firms whose gross income
was between $100,000 and $200,000 would have experienced a reduction of almost 225%.
Finally, 41 firms whose gross income in 1966 was between $200,000 and $2.5 million
would have had their net income after taxes reduced by some 28%. See id. at 321-22.
199 The NASD survey found that 1,000 of the approximately 2,400 members sur-
veyed retailed mutual funds as their primary activity. See id. at 316-24.
200 For an example of how such a rising scale operates, see SEC, Report of Special
Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 122 (1963) [herein-
after cited as Special Study].
201 In 1966, the median dollar amount of a mutual fund purchase was only $1,240.
SEC Report on the Public Policy Considerations of Investment Company Growth, H.R.
Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 206-07 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PPI]. A more
recent survey shows that of the Individuals surveyed who owned only mutual fund
shares, 71% valued their investment at less than $5,000. See Katona, Hybels and Schmie-
deskamp, Who Owns Mutual Funds? And Why? A Special Study, Inst. Inv., Feb. 1971,
at 36 [hereinafter cited as Katona].
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part, a fund salesman must constantly search out new customers in
order to make mutual fund selling a profitable enterprise.
Most mutual fund salesmen work on a part-time basis' and the
level of their commission income reflects this fact. The SEC's Special
Study, published in 1963, found that of the salesmen who worked for
firms which specialized in mutual funds, sixty-seven percent earned
less than $1,000 annually in commissions 2° 3 In contrast, only thirteen
percent of the salesmen who worked for nonspecializing firms and who
engaged in a general securities business in addition to selling mutual
funds earned less than $1,000 annually in commissions. 204 The com-
pensation of the salesmen who work full-time for an integrated
organization is, as might be expected, considerably higher than that
of the part-time salesman who works for a small broker-dealer
specializing in fund sales. For example, in 1966 a full-time salesman
for Investors Diversified Services earned, on the average, $8,000 per
annum.2°5
 But it must be remembered that IDS salesmen are full-
time salesmen and that therefore this $8,000 figure represents most, if
not all, of their income.
It seems clear that most mutual fund salesmen, especially those
who work.only part time, are not prospering by selling mutual funds.
If the compensation levels are further reduced, it is likely that a good
many salesmen would leave the business entirely. 206 While it is not
possible to: predict accurately the ultimate effects such an exodus
would have on the mutual fund industry, it is reasonable to antici-
pate that (a) some of the smaller independent broker-dealers, espe-
202
 The Special Study found that approximately two-thirds of the salesmen cov-
ered by its survey worked on a part-time basis. Special Study, supra note 200, at 121
n.66. The Institutional Investor Study found that 33 reporting life insurance companies
had a total of 19,200 agents qualified to sell mutual funds. SEC Institutional Investor
Study, supra note 181, at 535. Since these agents are primarily in the business of selling
life insurance, they can be considered part-time mutual fund salesmen.
203
 Special Study, supra note 200, at 121. This percentage undoubtedly would have
been higher if only part-time salesmen had been considered. The study, however, included
the salesmen of some fully-integrated organizations, most of whom work on a full-time
basis and have substantially higher earnings.
204 Id.
205 See 1967 Hearings, supra note 192, at 475 (remarks of Mr. Robert M. Loeffler,
Director and Vice-President of IDS). Approximately 70% of this income is attributable
to the sale of the shares of IDS-managed mutual funds. The remainder is derived from
the sale of other IDS products, such as face-amount certificates and life insurance. Id.
at 476.
206
 This may be true even for the full-time salesman. In his 1967 congressional
testimony Robert Loeffler of IDS noted that if the SEC's proposed 5% ceiling on the
sales load were adopted, the average annual compensation of an IDS salesman would drop
considerably. Id. at 484. As it was, the turnover rate among IDS salesmen during the
first two years of employment was approximately 50%. Id. at 493-94. The turnover rate
among mutual fund salesmen as a whole is considerably high. See Special Study, supra
note 200, at 96-98.
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daily those who concentrate on selling mutual funds, would probably
go out of business because of their inability to attract a sufficient
number of salesmen to generate enough sales to remain profitable,'
and (b) mutual fund selling would probably become more concen-
trated in fully-integrated organizations, large brokerage houses and,
to an increasing extent, insurance companies.'" Although the sales-
men of these organizations generally receive more commission income
from selling other products, such as life insurance, 209 they have the
advantage of more customer contact and they will often be able to sell
mutual fund shares as a supplement to their primary product or ser-
vice.
Any substantial decrease in the number of mutual fund sales-
men, especially those who work for firms which specialize in selling
mutual funds, could have a serious impact upon the sale of mutual
funds as a method of investment. Mutual funds, of course, will con-
tinue to be sold by registered representatives of stock exchange mem-
ber firms and nonspecializing NASD broker-dealers as well as in-
surance agents but, as noted, the financial inducement to concentrate
on selling mutual funds is hardly overwhelming 2 10
 It is likely, there-
fore, that these fund salesmen will continue to concentrate on those
products and services which provide greater income for both them-
selves' and their employers 2 12
 The real threat to mutual fund sales
207 A broker-dealer who specializes in fund sales must maintain a level of fund sales
which is sufficient to cover its overhead and other operating expenses. Although salesmen's
income is not usually an expense since they work on a commission basis, the broker-dealer
must make enough by way of his share of the sales load to cover his other expenses.
208 Many life insurance companies have entered the mutual fund business by way
of acquisition of an existing fund management company or the creation of a new fund
complex. In addition, some life insurers have executed selling agreements with unaffiliated
funds. In such a case, the insurer itself or a broker-dealer subsidiary of the insurer is a
member of the NASD. See SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 181, at 522-29.
See also Mattlin, New Policies for Insurance Companies: How Connecticut General is
Dealing Itself into the Fund Game, Inst. Inv., Jan., 1970, at 53.
208
 For example, a full-time life insurance agent typically receives from 75 to 80%
of a year's premium on a life insurance policy issued at age 35 during the first two or
three years the policy is in force. In the case of a fixed individual annuity issued at age
35, the salesman usually receives from 20 to 35% of the annual consideration paid. The
4 to 6% that a mutual fund salesman typically receives is hardly comparable. See SEC
Institutional Investor Study, supra note 181, at 536-37.
210 See note 202 supra; Special Study, supra note 200, at 121.
211 The Institutional Investor Study noted, for example, that "[w]hile it is difficult •
to evaluate agents' incentives to sell various products without being able to quantify the
differences in sales effort required relative to the size of the annual premium or other
payment, the magnitude of the differences in compensation for standard life insurance
products as opposed to individual annuities suggests that successful life insurance salesmen
are likely to continue to emphasize life insurance more than annuities (fixed or variable)
or mutual funds except where special tax considerations are present. Interviews with life
insurance officers confirm that this is a pervasive attitude among their more productive
agents." SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 181, at 537. See also Mattlin, New
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from the loss of what might be called the "specialist" salesman is that
there would be fewer salesmen going out to spread the "mutual fund
story." It is fairly well agreed that the concept of mutual funds as an
investment medium must be "sold" to the investing public. 213 The job
of the mutual fund salesmen is therefore twofold--i.e., first educating
the public and then selling to them. The more investors are aware of
mutual funds as an investment medium, the greater the likelihood of
more mutual fund sales (with the converse also being true). A recent
survey conducted on behalf of the Investment Company Institute
shows that seventy percent of American households surveyed were
ignorant about mutual funds 214 In addition, 58.1 million out of a U.S.
Census figure of 62.9 million households did not own mutual funds. 218
The importance of fund salesmen in making people aware of mutual
funds is shown by the surveys finding that present and past owners
of mutual funds ranked fund salesmen second only to business and
social contacts as the source from which they learned the most about
mutual funds 216
 When it is considered that somewhere along the line
these business and social contacts probably first learned about mutual
funds from a fund salesman, the snowball effect becomes evident. That
is, when a fund salesman does make a sale, he may actually be edu-
cating a number of people regarding the values of mutual funds as an
investment medium.'"
This reliance on salesmen to educate the investing public in part
Policies for Insurance Companies: How Connecticut General is Dealing Itself into the
Fund Game, Inst. Inv., jan., 1970, at 66.
212
 See Lynch, Can the Crosby Corporation be Improved? A Case Study in the
Marketing of Mutual Funds at 55 (1968) (unpublished Advanced Study Project in the
Wharton School of Commerce and Finance, Library, University of Pennsylvania).
218 See 1967 Hearings, supra note 192, at 514 (remarks of Mr. Allen); University
of Pennsylvania, Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 659, 783-84 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Conference] (remarks of Mr. Grant); Funds on the Defensive,
Forbes, Aug. 15, 1967, at 67. However, "contrary to what is often said about fund shares,
no-load fund shares are 'bought' by investors rather than 'sold' to them. • . ." 1967
Hearings, supra note 192, at 569 (remarks of Mr. Ronald T. Lyman).
214
 ICI, Survey of the Market for Mutual Funds, April 22, 1971 at 3.
218 Id. An earlier survey conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University
of Michigan found that 9% of a representative sample of 4,544 family units owned mutual
fund shares. Katona, supra note 201, at 35. Of all the security owners surveyed, 36%
owned mutual funds, with 11% owning exclusively mutual funds. Id. at 36.
218
 ICI, Survey of the Market for Mutual Funds, April 22, 1971, at 5. In the
University of Michigan Survey, the group which owned only mutual funds was asked
"How did you select the mutual fund(s) you bought?" Thirty-one % mentioned a
broker, 11% a mutual fund salesman and 32% mentioned someone else, primarily friends
and business associates. Katona, supra note 201, at 38.
21T In addition to encouraging their customers to talk to their friends and business
associates about mutual funds, a salesman will often ask the purchaser to sign a "radia-
tion card" which serves to introduce the salesman to friends and associates of the
purchaser. See Special Study, supra note 200, at 126-27.
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results from existing restrictions on advertising by mutual funds, 218
which prevents mutual funds from getting their message across to the
investing public by a method other than through dealers and sales-
men who sell fund shares. An easing of these advertising restrictions
would produce at least two desirable results. First, more effective
fund advertising could help in educating the more than fifty-eight
million U.S. households unaware of the values of mutual funds as an
investment medium. Second, more effective advertisements designed to
inform the public about mutual funds may serve to make the selling
of fund shares again a profitable business 2 10 This result might obtain
because a salesman hopefully would be dealing with a more aware
public and he could thus concentrate his sales effort on those who
have indicated an interest in mutual funds after seeing fund advertise-
ments. Hence a salesman could probably spend less time "prospect-
ing"' and more time selling. Although the salesman may receive less
compensation per sale, he may gain by consummating more sales.
VI. PUBLIC POLICY AND THE ADVERTISING RULES
A. Legislative Concern
The House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, re-
porting on H.R. 5480 (the bill that ultimately became the Securities
Act of 1933), stated that the underlying purpose of Section 10, which
indicates the information required in prospectuses and Section 2(10),
which defines "prospectus" to include any "advertisement . . • or
other communication offering any security for sale" was
to secure for potential buyers the means of understanding
the intricacies of the transaction into which they are invited.
The full revelations required in the filed "registration state-
ment" should not be lost in the actual selling process. This
requirement will undoubtedly limit the selling arguments
hitherto employed. That is its purpose. . . . Any objection
that the compulsory incorporation in selling literature and
sales argument of substantially all information concerning
the issue will frighten the buyer with the intricacy of the
transaction states one of the best arguments for the provi-
218 Discussion here is limited to advertising by the mutual funds themselves and not
advertising by the dealers who sell the funds. As will be noted later, there are differences
in the extent to which these two groups can advertise.
219 It is doubtful whether more effective advertising would eliminate the need for
salesmen. Most people think of mutual funds as a long-term investment, similar to life
insurance. This being the case, it is likely that salesmen would have to be utilized to
conduct selling on a person-to-person basis. See note 208 supra.
220 For a discussion of "prospecting" as a technique for selling mutual funds, see
Special Study, supra note 200, at 125-29.
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sion. The rank and file of securities buyers . . . should be
made aware that securities are intricate merchandise. 221
The congressional decision to require that offers to sell securities be
made only by way of a prospectus complying with statutory require-
ments was based in part on a finding that during the preceding decade
"[a]lluring promises of easy wealth were freely made with little or no
attempt to bring to the investor's attention those facts essential to
estimating the worth of any security. High-pressure salesmanship
rather than careful counsel was the rule in this most dangerous of
enterprises."222
 Although the prospectus requirements as set down in
1933 and as amended in 1954 223 leave something to be desired re-
garding the delivery of a prospectus prior to sale, 2" they have been
effective in restricting the nature of securities advertising, including
mutual fund advertising. 225
221
 H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1933).
222 Id. at 2.
228
 Prior to the 1954 Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933, a broker-dealer
could not make a written offer to sell a security during the waiting period,—i.e., after a
registration statement is filed but before it becomes effective. This was because an offer
was included in the definition of sale so that a written offer during the waiting period
was considered a sale which was prohibited until the registration statement became effec-
tive. In order to alleviate this situation, which prevented the desired dissemination of
information concerning an issue during the waiting period, the SEC sanctioned the use
of the "red herring" prospectus as well as an identifying statement, pursuant to Rule 132.
In 1954, Congress specifically sanctioned the making of written offers during the waiting
period while retaining the prohibition against sales until the registration statement
becomes effective. For a discussion of the pre-amendment situation as well as the amend-
ments see, S. Rep. No. 1036, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (1954); H.R. Rep. No. 1542, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 4-15 (1954).
224
 In addition to the dealers' examination contained in g 4(3) of the Securities Act,
15 U.S.C. { 77d(3) (1970), 11 5(b)(2) of that Act, 15 § 77e(b)(2) (1970),
requires only that a prospectus precede or accompany the delivery of a security. Accord-
ing to former SEC Commissioner McCormick,
[t]he prospectus has not proved to be an effective instrument for informing the
public. Because of what I regard as a serious defect in the statute, most sales
of new securities are being made through the use of oral communications,
including interstate telephone messages, and the prospectus is being delivered only
after the sale with confirmation, or the security. This is permitted by law. If the
Congress believes that the investor should have certain minimum prescribed
information before he purchases the security, and I think it does (certainly it is
dear to me that it did in 1933 when the law was adopted), it must revise the
law to see that the prospectus is delivered at a time when it can be , useful to
the investor in making his decision to buy, and not to be a mere memorial of
[the] past transaction.
See Hearings on H.R. 7550 and S. 2846 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1954). In the case of mutual funds, the
dealers' exemption does not apply. See § 24(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(d) (1970). It is still permissible, however, to make an oral offer and
to deliver the prospectus with the security.
225 When H.R. 5480 was originally drafted, the term prospectus was defined to
include any communication, oral or written, which offered a security for sale. See H.R.
5480, II 2(1), 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (Confidential Comm. Print Apr. 10, 1933). When the
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Whether the prospectus requirements, with their inherent limita-
tion on the type of advertising permitted, were intended to apply to
mutual fund shares is not clear from the legislative history of the
Securities Act. But one mutual fund proponent has suggested that it
is merely accidental that mutual fund shares are subject to the ad-
vertising restrictions applicable to other securities." He argues that
an investment in a mutual fund is analogous to investment in an
insurance plan, or to the offering of a full service bank, rather than to
the more conventional corporate security. 227 This argument is based
on the view that investment in a mutual fund is really a purchase of a
service—i.e., professional management rather than investment in a
security." While mutual fund shares probably were not the type
of security that Congress had in mind when it formulated the pro-
spectus requirements in 1933, there is no doubt that ample considera-
tion was given to the mutual fund in 1940 when Congress considered
methods for regulating investment companies. During this considera-
tion Congress was aware of two pertinent facts with respect to mutual
funds. First, the greater number of investment companies whose
shares were registered under the 1933 Act, and which were thus sub-
ject to the prospectus requirements, were open-end management com-
panies—i.e., mutual funds.' Second, Congress knew that prior to
passage of the 1933 Act, investment companies, including mutual
bill was introduced in the House on May 3, 1933, the reference to oral communications
had been deleted. See H.R. 5480, § 2(10), 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). Part I of this
article describes in detail how the present statutory scheme limits mutual fund advertis-
ing. See text accompanying notes 6-20 supra. For a discussion of how this statutory
scheme has been applied to mutual fund advertising, see Mattlin, The Trials and
Tribulations of Mutual Fund Advertising, Inst. Inv., March 1971 at 21 [hereinafter cited
as Mattlin].
226 See Mattlin, supra note 225, at 63 (statement of Nicholas G. Ciriello, Associate
General Counsel of Dreyfus Corp.).
227
 Id. It is interesting to note that the mutual fund share is compared to products
and services which are specifically exempt from the registration and hence the prospectus
requirements of the 1933 Act. See Securities Act of 1933, HI 3(a) (2), 3(a) (8), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77c(a)(2), 77c(a)(8) (1964). Section 2(13), which defines "insurance company" for
purposes of the 1933 Act, was amended in 1970. Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547
§ 27(h), 84 Stat..1413. It is also interesting to note that reference is not made to the
variable annuity, an insurance company sponsored product similar to the mutual fund,
which is subject to the same limitations in advertising, since the individual annuity
contracts must be registered under the 1933 Act. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
228 See Conference, supra note 213 at 775 (remarks of Gordon D. Henderson,
Esq.). For a contrasting view of the nature of a mutual fund share, see id. at 776 (remarks
of Richard M. Phillips, Esq.) ; PPI, supra note 201, at 76.
229 See Statement of Baldwin B. Bane, Director, Registration Division of the SEC
during the Hearings on S. 3580. Hearings on Investment Trusts and Investment Com-
panies, Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. 135-36 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. See also SEC, Report on
Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 70, 76th Cong., pt. 2 at
755-59 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Investment Trust Study].
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funds had made extensive use of advertising, in several media,"° and
that the level of this advertising decreased after 1933. 231 If Congress
did not consider the shares of a mutual fund as securities, or if it
determined that the prospectus requirements as applied to mutual
funds were too restrictive as regards their impact on mutual fund
advertising, one would expect that Congress would have made some
allowances or provided an exemption for mutual funds. It did not.
In fact, Congress initially took a stronger position with respect to
advertising by registered investment companies. Whereas there is no
requirement that a corporation file its advertisements with the SEC
at any time, Section 24(c) of S. 3580,232 the Senate bill dealing with
investment company regulation, would have prohibited a registered
investment company from using any pamphlet, circular, form letter
or other literature in the sale of investment company shares unless
copies of the literature were filed with the SEC as part of the registra-
tion statement or as an amendment thereto. Since mutual fund
shares are continually being offered, this section would have required
a fund to amend its registration statement every time it changed its
advertising materials. It was only after discussions between the SEC
and industry representatives"' that this section was changed to what
is today Section 24(b) of the 1940 Act, which requires that copies
of all advertising and sales literature used by mutual funds be filed
with the SEC within ten days after their first use or publication. 234
All of these facts taken together indicate (1) that Congress was
aware that mutual fund advertising was being restricted by the pro-
spectus requirements of the 1933 Act, and (2) that Congress did not
consider mutual fund shares so unique as to require more liberal
treatment with respect to the advertising of those shares.
230
 See Investment Trust Study, supra note 229, at 844-47 for examples of advertise-
ments by open-end management companies (mutual funds). See also Supplemental Report
to the Investment Trust Study dealing with Fixed and Semi-Fixed Trusts, H.R. Doc. No.
567, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 151-56 (1940) for a description of advertisements used by fixed
and semi-fixed trusts.
231
 See id. at 153 (statement of John Sherman Myers, Chairman of the Board of
Distributors Group, Inc.).
232
 S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 24(c) (1940).
255
 The legislative background of the Investment Company Act is notable for the
close and continuous cooperations between industry representatives and the SEC. See
North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44 Notre Dame
Lawyer 677 (1969); Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 Wash. U.L.Q.
303 (1941).
234 Investment Company Act of 1940, § 24(b), 15 U.S.C. 80a-24(b) (1970). If
the sponsor of the advertisement is a member of the NASD, then a copy of the advertise-
ment must be filed with the NASD within 3 days after publication. See CCH NASD
Manual I( 5002 (1971). In a bulletin dated Nov. 8, 1968, the NASD encouraged its
members to file with it copies of their advertisements prior to publication.
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B. SEC Enforcement of the Prospectus Requirements
In proposing to adopt Rule 134 under the 1933 Act, the SEC
clearly indicated that tombstone advertisements
are intended to be limited to announcements identifying the
existence of a public offering and the availability of a pro-
spectus and they are not intended to be selling literature of
any kind.
The proposed rule would . .. restrict the content of
such communications to simple statements of fact identify-
ing the security and the nature of the offering. Financial in-
formation or descriptions of the business or the security
would not be included, since the amended statute [the 1933
Act as amended in 1954] contemplates that written informa-
tion on such subjects will be furnished by sellers to prospec-
tive investors only by means of a prospectus meeting the
requirements of Section 10.'"
Whether a tombstone or any other type advertisement constitutes
selling material depends upon whether it offers a security for sale.
The term "offer for sale" has been interpreted broadly, consistent
with the general view that the federal securities laws are to be con-
strued "not technically and restrictively, but rather flexibly to effec-
tuate [their] remedial purposes."'" Thus the SEC has taken the posi-
tion that
the publication of information and statements, and publicity
efforts, generally, made in advance of a proposed financing,
although not couched in terms of an express offer, may in
fact contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing
public interest in the issuer or in securities of an issuer in a
manner which raises a serious question whether the publicity
is not in fact part of a selling effort.'
In In re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 238 the Commission stated that
the terms "offer to sell" and "prospectus" "are not limited to com-
munications which constitute an offer in the common law contract
sense, or which on their face purport to offer a security. Rather .. .
they include 'any document which is designed to procure an order for
235 SEC Securities Act Release No. 3535 (March 10, 1955) [1952-1956 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 76,333 at 79,420.
230
 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). See also
SEC v. Starmont, 31 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wash. 1939).
237 SEC Securities Act Release No. 3844 (Oct. 8, 1957), 22 Fed. Reg. 8359 (1957).
238 38 S.E.C. 843 (1959).
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a security."' The courts have also liberally construed the term
"offer." For example, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc v. Bangor Punta Corp."° held that press
releases announcing that securities would be sold at some future time
and containing an attractive description of the issuer's securities were
offers to sell securities in violation of Section 5(c) of the 1933 Act,
since a registration statement covering the securities had not been
filed 241
 Although the issue of whether a particular advertisement or
publicity constitutes an offer to sell a security has arisen mostly in the
context of prefiling publicity, the SEC has applied the same standards
to postfiling publicity. Thus, where an advertisement or other com-
munication offers a security for sale, the advertisement or communica-
tion has been considered a prospectus as defined in Section 2(10), and,
unless this "prospectus" meets the requirements of Section 10, its use
by way of any of the jurisdictional means is considered a violation of
Section 5(h) (1) of the 1933 Act.242
The way in which the prospectus requirements, as interpreted by
the SEC and the courts, have affected mutual fund advertising is illus-
trated by the Commission's recent action against the American Gen-
eral Insurance Company and some of its subsidiaries. Although the
case was settled before a trial on the merits, it provides an insight into
the problems confronting mutual funds, especially those that are only
part of a' larger financial conglomerate. In its complaint, 2" the SEC
sought to enjoin American General Insurance Company (American
General), Channing Financial Corporation (Channing Financial),
Channing Company, Inc., (Channing Company) and the Variable An-
nuity Life Insurance Company (VALIC) from further violations of Sec-
tion 5(b) (1) of the 1933 Act and Section 24(b) of the 1940 Act. At
the time the complaint was filed, American General owned all the out-
standing shares of Channing Financial, a holding company which in
turn owned all the outstanding shares of Channing Company. The
Channing Company was the principal underwriter and distributor of
the shares issued by the Channing group of investment companies.
In addition to its relationship with Channing Financial, American
233
 Id. at 848. See also Axe Securities Carp., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,148; Norman Dacey Associates, Inc., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. If 77,816; First Maine Corp., 38 S.E.C. 882 (1959); Bankers Securities
Co., 6 S.E.C. 631 (1940).
240 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970).
241 Id. at 573-76. See also SEC v. Arvida Corp., 169 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)
(by stipulation); SEC v. Starmont, 31 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wash. 1939).
242 See Axe Securities Corp., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 77,148; First Maine Corp. 38 S.E.C. 882 (1959); Bankers Securities Co. Inc., 6 S.E.C.
631 (1940).
243 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 92,584.
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General owned, directly or indirectly, 48.9 percent of the outstanding
shares of VALIC, which sponsored two registered investment compa-
nies issuing the variable annuity contracts written by VALIC.
The complaint alleged that nine advertisements which American
General had caused to be published in the Wall Street Journal' of-
fered for sale securities of the Channing group of investment compa-
nies, as well as the variable annuities sponsored by VALIC, and that
they therefore were prospectuses as defined in Section 2(10) of the
1933 Act. Since these advertisements did not contain the information
as required by section 10, their publication, it was alleged, had violated
section 5(b)(1).' A review of the advertisements shows that only
two "headlined" Channing or VALIC. One provided that "[i] t took
foresight for us to move toward variable annuities 13 years ago. We
are thinking of today's variables." The other read: "We have a mutual
concern for the net worth of our customers. It's called Channing." A
third advertisement merely mentioned the Channing mutual funds and
VALIC. In the remaining six advertisements the only reference to
either Channing or VALIC was the inclusion of Channing Company
and VALIC in a list at the bottom of each advertisement of American
General's financial service companies. The SEC alleged that all nine
of the advertisements contained language which constituted an offer
to sell American General securities. In addition, the SEC alleged that
three of the advertisements touted particular subsidiaries of American
General in an effort to sell the securities distributed by those subsidi-
aries. One advertisement referred to VALIC and stated, in part, that,
"Valic's growth has been impressive: from $8.1 million of annuitants'
funds in 1965 to $71.4 million at the end of 1968."
The other two advertisements referred to the Channing group of
mutual funds, which were distributed by the Channing Company. One
of these specified the funds and named their investment adviser: 24 °
"Well known too, are the five Channing mutual funds with more than
$800 million of assets. They are managed by Channing Company, Inc.
and secure their investment guidance from Van Strum & Towne, Inc."
According to the SEC, the other advertisement contained a more
obvious selling effort. It provided, in part:
American General feels that there is an important place for
244 See 51 BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep., May 20, 1970, at B-7 to B-15 for reprints of
the American General advertisements.
245 The allegation with respect to violation of § 24(b) of the 1940 Act was simply
that American General had failed to file copies of the advertisements with the SEC as
required by that section.
240 It should be noted that the naming of a fund's investment adviser is not within
the scope of Rule 134. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4709 (July 14, 1964) 1 CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 1461 (1970). In addition, a statement setting forth the amount of
total fund assets is not permitted under Rule 134. Id. at ¶ 1462.
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mutual funds in a well-planned personal financial program.
And we are busy adding them to the portfolios of our insur-
ance representatives. We believe this will enable them to
function as financial advisers rather than as advocates of
fixed dollars only or equity dollars alone.
We were early among those many life insurance companies
which became distributors of mutual funds. In 1967 First
Participating Fund, Inc. came into the American General
family. Early this year we acquired the adviser and national
distributor of the five well-known Channing funds, with more
than $800 million of assets managed."'
The ad also stated that "in the field of financial services, we believe
our record of foresight is impressive." The SEC charged that all the
advertisements, particularly the latter three, "contribute to condition-
ing the public mind or arousing public interest in the issuer." 248
As mentioned, the American General case was settled out of
court24° and so there has been no determination whether any or all of
the advertisements constituted an offer to sell securities. Perhaps a
decision on the merits would have provided guidelines as to what con-
stitutes conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest in
securities. These guidelines would be significant with respect to mutual
fund advertising since it is this standard which the SEC uses to eval-
uate mutual fund advertisements.
The complaint has been made that the SEC is too eager to find
some conditioning influence in mutual fund advertising copy. For
example, the SEC informed the Energy Fund that its use of a rocket
ship pointed upward in its logo was misleading since it indicated that
Energy Fund's portfolio would go up. 25° Other examples of the SEC's
strict policy include
the fund that wanted to show acorns in its logo; since acorns
into great oaks grow, the logo was rejected. Another fund
wanted to use a rainbow; nothing doing, because that sug-
gested a pot of gold might be in the offing. The ICI [Invest-
247
 SEC Securities Act Release No. 3844 (Oct. 8, 1957), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 3250-56 (1971).
248 See note 244 supra.
248
 See Litigation Release No. 4849 (Dec. 17, 1970). In settlement of the action,
American General, without admitting the alleged violations, entered into an undertaking
to comply with § 5(b)(1) of the 1933 Act and § 24(b) of the 1940 Act. One reason the
defendants may have decided to settle was the fact that this suit was not the first time
they had gotten into trouble for their advertisements. During 1967-68, Channing Company
was warned by the Commission and the NASD's Investment Company Committee that
certain of its advertisements went beyond § 2(10) (b) and Rule 134. The NASD threatened
disciplinary action if there were any further violations. See Analysis, 51 BNA Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep., May 20, 1970, at B-1, B-2.
280 See Mattlin, supra note 225, at 21.
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ment Company Institute] wanted to run an institutional ad
showing a man in a rocking chair that would present the
retirement benefits of mutual fund investing; the SEC said
O.K. as long as the smile on the man in the chair was re-
moved—and it was. . . • Another fund's ad was turned down
simply because it used the color gold, and you know what
that implies. Still another fund was told it couldn't employ
a picture of its divisional office building in an ad because the
building was so handsome it suggested that the fund, too,
was solid and exceptional.251
The SEC's policy with respect to mutual fund advertising copy has
become more restrictive since the adoption of Rule 134 in 1955. Ini-
tially the SEC permitted a fund to use illustrations in its advertise-
ments. In 1962, however, the Commission decided that the use of
illustrations was being abused and consequently prohibited any new
advertisement which contained any illustration except the fund's trade-
mark.2 " This "no illustration" rule was not applied retroactively, so
that some funds (Dreyfus, for example) were permitted to continue
the use of illustrations and movement2" in their advertisements. 254
Most of the funds which operate under this grandfather clause have
not tried to clear new advertising with the SEC since the Commission
has indicated that once a new advertisement is submitted, it will re-
open the fund's entire file, review all advertisements previously filed,
and rule on them in light of present rules and interpretations."' Funds
are thus reluctant to take the chance that advertisements operating
under the grandfather clause may become prohibited. It appears that
the SEC has gone to extreme lengths to find a conditioning influence
in mutual fund advertising copy. Whether this approach is considered
vigorous enforcement of the prospectus requirements or overzealous
bureaucracy makes little difference to the fund manager who wants
to inform the public about his product.
251 Id. at 23. See generally, "Lions, Yes. Rockets, No i," Forbes, Aug. 15, 1911, at 49.
The SEC Staff, however, has in more recent times changed some of its policies with respect
to these matters. It is understood that the Staff has approved a logo with a rocket pointing
upward, and that there is currently a fund which employs an acorn as its logo. Moreover,
the Staff has not objected to the advertisements presently being published by the ICI
which contain photographs of smiling persons who have invested in the mutual funds,
252 See Perez, A Critical Appraisal of the Marketing Structure and Techniques used
in Distributing Mutual Fund Shares 138 (Ph.D. Dissertation, N.Y.U. Graduate School of
Business, 1965) [hereinafter cited as Perez].
258 Movement is allowed to form the fund's logo, as in Oppenheimer's hands coming
together. See Mattlin, supra note 225, at 68.
254 Id. See also Mattlin, The Problems of Being the Enterprise Fund, Inst. Inv.,
March, 1970, at 70; "Lions, Yes. Rockets, Nol," supra note 251.
255 See Perez supra note 252.
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C. Restrictions on Institutional Advertising
The present restrictions on advertising by mutual funds also ex-
tend to general advertisements, by broker-dealers, designed to inform
public investors of the services they provide, including the availability
of mutual funds. Since broker-dealers (especially the larger brokerage
firms) generally offer a number of funds, they are permitted to de-
scribe the concept of the mutual fund as an investment medium. Such
generic advertising is not, however, to be used by the broker-dealer
to offer for sale the securities of a particular fund. The position of the
SEC with respect to this generic advertising is set forth in an opinion
letter of Edward H. Cashion, former Chief Counsel of the Commis-
sion's Division of Corporation Finance, which states, in part, that:
The question of whether a particular advertisement or
communication constitutes a "prospectus" as defined in Sec-
tion 2 (10) of the Securities Act of 1933 depends upon the
intent of the advertiser or the person transmitting such com-
munication and the nature of the material involved. Where
the purpose is to obtain purchasers for a particular security,
there is an offering of that security within the meaning of
Section 2 (3) of the Act, even though the name of the secu-
rity is not disclosed. If, in response to inquiries, it is intended
to send a prospectus relating to a specific registered security,
it is apparent that the purpose of the solicitation is to obtain
purchasers for such registered security. Under these circum-
stances, the distribution of the communication through the
mails or interstate commerce results in a violation of Section 5.
The sender, of course, is the best judge of his intention
in these matters. If no decision to offer specific registered se-
curities is made until after consideration is given to the in-
vestor's circumstances, objectives and preferences and if the
matter distributed does not refer to any specific security but
contains only information of general interest to the investing
public, [the SEC] would not be inclined to question the pro-
priety of the advertising and distribution of this type of ma-
terial. This assumes that no security is named in the com-
munication, that the material does not indicate that it has
been prepared by an issuer or a distributor of named secu-
rities and that the sender has not decided upon a specific
registered security to be offered to persons who respond to
the solicitation.'"
250 CCH NASD Manual 1 5252 (1971). In G. J. Mitchell, Jr., Co., 40 S.E.C. 409
(1960) the SEC held that certain generic advertisements dealing with life insurance stocks
were prospectuses as defined in section 2(10), even though they did not refer to particu-
lar securities. The Commission found that the advertisements were designed to arouse
the interest of prospective investors in life insurance stock generally but that in follow-up
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Thus a broker-dealer is free to advertise its offering of mutual funds
generally so long as he does not intend to sell the securities of a spe-
cific fund to those who make inquiries as a result of the advertise-
ment?"
Arguably, the informational function which would be served by
a liberalization of the present advertising restrictions can be sufficiently
served through the use of this generic advertising. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that those broker-dealers who can afford to advertise extensively
the availability of mutual funds would do so since the sale of mutual
funds is not likely to be the most profitable aspect of their business.'"
And if a broker-dealer pushed the shares of a particular fund in return
for portfolio brokerage, the generic advertisements might be construed
to be prospectuses on the ground that the broker-dealer intended to
sell the shares of a particular fund at the time the advertisement was
published.
The most likely source of general information concerning the
benefits of mutual fund investment is the Investment Company Insti-
tute (ICI), a trade association which represents funds holding over
ninety percent of total mutual fund assets. As with broker-dealers, the
ICI is permitted to sponsor generic advertising designed to inform the
investing public about mutual funds as an investment medium. The
advantage that the ICI has over broker-dealers is that it has no direct
financial interest in pushing the securities of any particular fund. Thus
the possibility that the ICI would be open to the charge that it was
offering the securities of a particular fund for sale appears remote.
Since 1964 the ICI has engaged in a program of generic advertising
to familiarize the public"' with the benefits of mutual fund investment;
contact, the broker-dealer's salesmen focused on the stock in which the broker-dealer was
dealing.
257 In order to avoid the charge that it is offering particular securities for sale in
its generic advertisements, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith has agreed not to
sell its own Edie Fund. See Mattlin, supra note 225, at 63.
25s See text accompanying note 219 supra.
250
 The following table indicates the approximate amounts that the ICI has spent in
its advertising program since 1964:
Fiscal Year Approximate Expenditure '(000)
1964 $593
1965 4,38
1966 225
1967 431
1968 254
1969 370
1970 331*
Source: ICI Official
* The ICI ceased spending on advertising on June 30, 1970, and $170,000 was
carried over to fiscal 1971. The funds spent on advertising are derived from an . assessment
against ICI members.
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as its recent survey indicates, 260 however, the results have not been
gratifying.
D. SEC Proposals to Change the Advertising Rules as
They Relate to Investment Companies
On December 1, 1971, the SEC released for public comment a
number of proposed changes relating to investment company advertis-
ing."' The changes would be effected by amending Rule 134 to provide
greater latitude in tombstone advertisements, by adding a new Rule
135A, and by amending Rule 434A to permit registered investment
companies to use a summary prospectus.2 °2 In its release announcing
the proposed rule changes, the SEC acknowledged the frequent com-
plaint that "a tombstone advertisement accomplishes nothing because
many persons do not even know what a mutual fund is." 2" It is in
response to this complaint that the SEC proposes to amend Rule 134
to permit in a tombstone advertisement "a general description of an
investment company, its general attributes, method of operation and
services offered, provided the description is not inconsistent with the
operation of the particular fund mentioned in the tombstone advertise-
ment."2"
In addition to reference to the general attributes of a particular
fund, the amended rule would permit advertisements that contain
offers, descriptions and explanations of products and services which
do not constitute securities to be combined with a tombstone adver-
tisement relating to the securities of an investment company. 2" This
combined advertising would be permitted only on condition that the
nontombstone portions of the advertisement "do not relate directly to
the desirability of owning or purchasing a security," 266 that the tomb-
stone portion of the advertisement otherwise complies with Rule 134,
and that it be segregated in an enclosed area in the advertisement.
On the surface this proposed change appears to cover the advertise-
ments published by the American General Insurance Co., previously
discussed in detail. It must be remembered, however, that American
280 See text accompanying notes 213-17 supra.
201 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5213 (Dec. 1971), [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 11 78,433 (1972).
262 Presently, registered investment companies cannot use a summary prospectus
since Form S-5, the form used by such investment companies to register securities under
the Securities Act, does not provide for a summary prospectus. Under Rule 434A, use of a
summary prospectus is allowed only if, inter ails., "the form used for registration of the
securities to be offered provides for the use of a summary prospectus. . . ." 17 C.F.R.
230.434A (1971).
203 [Currents CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,433 at 80,951 (1972).
284 Id.
285 Id.
208 Id.
1010
THE ROLE OF ADVERTISING IN THE MUTUAL FUNDS INDUSTRY
General was charged with offering securities for sale through its ad-
vertisements. There is nothing in the proposed amendments to Rule
134 which would permit an investment company to use advertising as
a selling device. Thus it is not clear whether American General would
have been sued had the proposed rule changes been in effect. 07
Changes with respect to generic advertising are also contemplated
in the proposed rule changes. Under proposed Rule 135A, a broker-
dealer, including one who underwrites a particular fund, would be per-
mitted to advertise generically investment company securities so long
as a particular security is not named in the advertisement?" This
rule is a departure from the SEC's long held position that a broker-
dealer who underwrites or sponsors a particular security presumably
intends to sell that security and therefore is not permitted to utilize
generic advertising since such an advertisement would be considered
a prospectus. Proposed Rule 13 5A would limit the contents of generic
advertisements
to explanatory information relating to the nature of, and ser-
vices offered by investment companies generally, the mention
or explanation of investment companies of different generic
types, and offers, descriptions and explanations of products
and services not constituting securities which do not relate
directly to the desirability of owning or purchasing a security
("combined" advertising). The advertisement or other com-
munication could contain an invitation to inquire for further
information and would be required to state the name and
address of the broker, dealer or other person sponsoring the
communication.2"
In addition to the above information, a generic advertisement
would have to include the name of a particular security if, during the
previous calendar year, thirty percent or more of the advertisement
sponsor's sales of total mutual fund sales involved the securities of
one fund or complex of funds. Further, the sponsor would be re-
quired to state in the advertisement either the approximate percent of
its sales of the securities of that particular fund relative to its total
fund sales or, if the sponsor did not wish to disclose the percentage,
he could simply identify the securities of the fund in which he special-
ized, state his relationship with the issuer and state that he sold or
sponsored the named security.270 The purpose of this requirement is
to give notice to the investor who reads a generic advertisement that
its sponsor has an interest in selling the securities of a particular fund
207 See Phillips, Mutual Fund Advertising, Rev, of Sec. Reg., at 980 (Feb. 4, 1972).
266
 [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 4 78,433 at 80,952 (1972),
209
 Id, See proposed Rule 135A (a)(1)-(4), (6). Id.
270
 See proposed Rule 135A. Id.
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and, more important, that the sponsor sells the securities of other
f unds .271
It is unclear from the SEC's release whether Rule 135A com-
pletely abrogates the Cashion opinion. A literal construction of the
proposed rule would seem to permit a broker-dealer , to publish a
generic advertisement even though at the time of publication the
broker-dealer intends to sell the securities of a particular fund; only
those broker-dealers whose sales of a particular fund during the prior
calendar year exceeded thirty percent of their total fund sales would
be required to disclose the name of the security and their relationship
with the issuer. Under this literal reading of proposed Rule 135A, the
Cashion opinion clearly can no longer be considered the policy of the
SEC. The proposed rule can, however, be construed simply as elimi-
nating the presumption that the underwriters and sponsors of fund
securities intend, at the time their generic advertisement is published,
to sell the securities of the fund or funds they underwrite or sponsor.
Under this construction, a broker-dealer who, at the time he publishes
a generic advertisement, actually (rather than presumably) intends to
sell the securities of a particular fund may be deemed to have offered
a particular security for sale by way of the generic advertisement. This
interpretation of proposed Rule 135A is consistent for the most part
with the Cashion opinion. If the SEC adopts these advertising rule
changes it should clearly indicate its interpretation of proposed Rule
I35A.
Perhaps the most far-reaching change effected by the proposed
rules is the one which would permit investment companies to use a
summary prospectus. Under the proposed changes, Rule 434A 272
would be amended to permit expressly the use of a summary prospec-
tus by registered investment companies. Form S-5, the form used by
registered investment companies to register their securities under the
Securities Act of 1933, would also be amended to indicate that a sum-
mary prospectus may not be used
unless a registration statement under the Securities Act of
1933 is in effect, or if at the time of its use the registrant has
had a prior history of operations other than that of an invest-
ment company during the past five years or if certain specified
transactions with affiliates have occurred during the past
three years, or if at that time the registrant does not intend
271 Rule 135A would also require that the sponsor of an advertisement have available
for sale the type of security, service or product described in the advertisement. Id. at
80,952.
272 17 C.F.R. I 230.434A (1971).
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to meet the requirements of Subchapter M of the Internal
Revenue Code.'"
A summary prospectus under the proposed rule changes would in-
clude "a brief statement of the investment objectives of the registrant
which statement shall not be inconsistent with the statement as to
investment objectives contained in the prospectus included in the
registration statement."274
In addition, the summary prospectus would include certain of the
information contained in Form N-8B-1,2" regarding specific ac-
tivities of the fund, if the fund has an affirmative policy with respect
to these activities.'" On the outside front cover of the summary pro-
spectus the registrant must state clearly (I) the maximum sales load
expressed as a percentage of the public offering price per share; (2)
any redemption or repurchase charge; and (3) a legend in bold-face
type urging all interested persons to send for and examine the full
statutory prospectus before purchasing the shares of the fund.'" The
proposed amendment also provides that the registrant may request
that certain information be omitted from the summary prospectus
and that the SEC "may . . . require the inclusion of other informa-
tion in addition to, or in substitution for, the information [already]
required in any case where such information is necessary or appro-
278
 [Current) CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,433 at 80,953 (1972).
274 See proposed addition to Form S-5. Id. at 80,954.
278
 Form N-813-1 is the form prescribed by the SEC for the registration statements
of management investment companies. See 3 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 51,293.
278
 For example, the registrant's policy with respect to the borrowing of money, the
underwriting of securities of other issuers, the concentration of investment in particular
industries, the purchase and sale of real estate, the purchase or sale of commodities or
commodity contracts and the making of loans to other persons need not be set forth in
the summary prospectus unless the registrant has an affirmative policy to engage in such
activities. See [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,433 (1972). As Form N-8B-1 now
exists, a registrant must set forth in Item 4 of the form its policies with respect to the
above and other activities whether or not they constitute affirmative policies. In addition,
the registrant may under the proposed rule exclude from the summary prospectus certain
of the information required to be stated in Item 5 of Form N-8B-1. For example, the
registrant need not state the percentage of its assets which are permitted to be invested
in any other issuer (except government securities) unless that percentage exceeds 5% of its
assets; it need not state the percentage of voting securities of any one issuer which it may
acquire unless that percentage exceeds 10%; it need not state its policy with respect to
investment in the securities of other investment companies unless it is permitted to invest
more than 5% of its assets in such other investment companies; it need not state its
policy with respect to investing in companies for the purpose of exercising control
unless it is permitted to do so and it need not disclose its rate of portfolio turnover unless
it has averaged over 75% for the past three years. Id.
277 Id. at 80,953-54. The proposed instructions to Form S-5 would make clear that
no sales literature may be used unless preceded or accompanied by a full statutory
prospectus.
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priate for the protection of investors." 2' The purpose of this provi-
sion is to require disclosure of adverse facts which would differentiate
the fund from the typical mutual fund."'
Although a fund is not permitted to include financial statements
or lists of investments in the summary prospectus, it is required to in-
clude information with respect to per share income and capital changes
covering the previous ten years of operation or the total number of
years that the fund has been in existence if less than ten." Among
the capital changes required to be stated are the changes in net asset
value and changes in net realized and unrealized profits (and losses)
on securities. In addition, the ratio of operating expenses to average
net assets, the ratio of net income to average net assets and the num-
ber of shares outstanding must be stated. 281 Although inclusion of this
information in a summary prospectus may not satisfy fund managers
who might wish to publicize their performance records,' it does pro-
vide investors a basis for comparing the growth records of different
funds having the same investment objectives.'
The value of a summary prospectus to a mutual fund is in its use
as an advertisement. Under existing restrictions, which allow only the
use of the full statutory prospectus, the cost of printing a full pro-
spectus and using it as an advertisement is prohibitive. 284 Such may
not be the case if mutual funds can use a summary prospectus, espe-
cially where the particular fund lacks affirmative policies with respect
to the activities described in Form N-8B-t and thus could exclude
278
 Id. at 80,954.
273
 Id. at 80,953.
280
 This information is the same as that required by Item 12 of Form N-8B-1. The
proposed amendments to Form S-5 would require that this information be set forth not
further back in the summary prospectus than the third page thereof and that it not be
preceded by any other chart or table.
28-1
 See Item 12(a) of Form N-8B-1, 3 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 51,293 at 39,255.
282 Even if publication of performance records is not considered an attempt to sell
the securities of a fund, it could be argued that it is misleading and violative of the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws if performance was measured on other
than a risk-adjusted basis. For a discussion of performance standards in the context of
incentive fee arrangements, see H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 263-65 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as SEC Institutional Investor Study]. Indeed, it has been suggested
that the per share income and capital change table which would be permitted under the
proposed rules would be misleading unless per share data are risk adjusted. See 137 BNA
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep., Feb. 2, 1972, at A-11, A-12.
283
 Fluctuation in the value of portfolio securities as well as fund sales (including
reinvestment) and redemptions are the basic determinants of a fund's net assets. A table
which shows changes in net assets indirectly indicates the fund's performance both in the
context of changes in the value of portfolio securities and in sales of fund shares. It has
been found that on a cumulative basis, performance is followed by increased cash inflow
(sales). H.R. Rep. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 343-44 (table V-19b) (1962) [herein-
after cited as Wharton Report].
284 The Dreyfus Fund, however, has printed its full prospectus as a supplement to
the Sunday New York Times.
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reference to such activities in its summary prospectus. It remains to
be seen whether funds, particularly the smaller ones, would determine
that the possibility of increased sales to be derived from publishing a
summary prospectus as an advertisement outweighs the costs in-
volved.
E. Some Additional Proposals
In the Survey of Mutual Fund Investors conducted by the Se-
curities Research Unit of the Wharton School of Finance and Com-
merce for the Special Study,'" it was noted that:
[T]he generally low level of knowledge displayed by most
mutual fund investors regarding their funds is one of the most
significant findings of the survey. . . . On the average,
slightly over an hour was devoted to reading the prospectus,
and often little of its contents was retained. Knowledge of
sales charges and sources of funds' earnings was frequently
inadequate, and knowledge of the expenses for fund opera-
tions was negligible. It might be observed that although the
typical prospectus provides much of the relevant information
necessary to appraise fund operations, its complexity, legal
tone, and lack of explanations and clarifications limit its ef-
fectiveness for the average investor. In addition it should be
noted that the prospectus gives no comparative data relating
to fund performance. Thus, there may be a considerable gap
between a document which satisfies the requirements of legal
disclosure and one which promotes effective . understanding.2"
It is clear from this statement that the statutory prospectus delivered
to the average mutual fund investor does not greatly enhance his
knowledge of his investment. Since the summary prospectus would
contain less information, it is not likely that its use would lead to
greater investor knowledge of his investment.'" The essential fact
which an investor would like to know about a particular fund is how
it has performed relative to other funds having the same investment
objective. A summary prospectus which otherwise complies with pro-
posed rule changes should also be required to contain information
with respect to a fund's performance over a given period."' Such
285 SEC, Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 265, app. XI-A (1963).
288 Id. at 347-48.
287 Use of a summary prospectus in no way dispenses with the obligation to provide
an investor with the statutory prospectus before any other sales literature is provided.
See note 277 supra. Knowledge of the operations of a particular mutual fund is to be dis-
tinguished from awareness of mutual funds generally as an investment medium.
288 It is essential that funds be required to include this information—otherwise funds
having poor performance records would not be inclined to include it.
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information should be presented on a standardized basis, including
adjustments , for the risk assumed by the managers of the fund.'" In
addition to the inclusion of these risk-adjusted performance figures,
the summary proSpectus should indicate that there exist other funds
having the same investment objectiNies. This disclosure hopefully
would induce an investor to inquire into these other funds to compare
their performance.
Coupled with this use of a summary prospectus should be an
effort to make the statutory prospectus more readable to the average
investor. The SEC has already proposed the adoption of changes in
this direction29° In addition, either the Securities Act or the Invest-
ment Company Act should be amended to require, in the case of in-
vestment company securities, the delivery of the statutory prospectus
prior to consummation of the sale' so as to give an investor time to
digest the information contained therein and to compare funds which
have the same investment objectives. An exception to. this require-
ment can be made in the case of an unsolicited order, since it can
reasonably be assumed that the investor is already familiar with the
fund. A statutory prospectus should, however, accompany the se-
curity. The above recommendations are consistent with the general
policy of disclosure underlying the Securities Act. Although the use
of performance statistics may be considered a selling effort,'" it may
also be considered a form of disclosure Which, when combined with a
more readable statutory prospectus, may lead to a better informed
mutual fund investor.
289
 See note 282 supra. For a discussion of the beta coefficient which is the standard
risk measure see, I. Friend, M. Blume & J. Crockett, Mutual Funds and Other Institu-
tional Investors: A New Perspective 54-55 (1971); Oberg's Critique: Beta in Investment
Portfolios, Weekly Bond Buyer, Jan. 3, 1972, at 11. Cf. SEC Institutional Investor Study,
supra note 282, at 264-65..
'	 • 220
 See SEC, Securities Act Release No. 5164 (July 16, 1971) [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed, Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,152. In a related move, the SEC has decided to
permit the use in a prospectus of photographs of a registrant's management, principal
properties and principal products so long as use of such photographs is not misleading.
See SEC, Securities Act Release No. 5171 (July 20, 1971) [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 78,155.
291 Under existing Iaw ($ 5(b)(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. •$ 77e(b)(2)
(1970)), a statutory prospectus must precede or accompany the delivery of a security. The
Survey of Mutual Fund Investors found, however, that 20% of the mutual fund investors
surveyed indicated that they had never received a prospectus. See Special Study, supra
note 285, at 297-98, app. XI-A.
292 The major objection to the use of performance figures is that they may mislead a
naive investor to believe that similar performance would he obtained in the future.
To the extent that this performance may not be obtained, it is similar to a corporation
projecting what its earnings will be at some future time. In this latter regard, SEC Chair-
man Casey has indicated that the current restrictions on earnings projections should be
reconsidered in light of practical realities. See Wall Street Journal, Nov. 19, 1971, at 6,
col. 3-4. Sec also Mann, Prospectuses: Unreadable or Just Unread?—A Proposal to Re-
examine Policies Against Permitting Projections, 40 . Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 222 (1971).
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F. Impediments to the Expanded Use of Advertising by
Mutual Funds
If the SEC proposals regarding advertising by mutual funds are
adopted and if, as a result, mutual funds determine to increase their
advertising expenditures, the question arises as to who will bear the
burden of these increased expenditures. The observations previously
made with respect to possible sources of additional compensation for
those who sell mutual fund shares"' are equally applicable here; the
only difference is that here the increased expenditures would be for
advertising rather than for direct compensation of the participants in
the mutual fund distribution chain. As noted previously, there exist
three possible sources of additional compensation which can also be
the source for funds to be used for advertising. These are the sales
load, the fund's adviser and the fund itself--i.e., the fund's share-
holders. As was also . noted, there are obstacles which may prevent
the utilization of any one or all of these sources.
Although an increase in the sales load appears to be the most
equitable source, since the cost of advertising would be borne by in-
coming shareholders rather than existing shareholders, there is, as was
previously noted,254 some indication that Congress expected the sales
load to be reduced. If this in fact is the case, then it is unlikely that
sales loads would be permitted to be increased to cover the cost of
advertising, especially if there are no demonstrable benefits to those
fund shareholders who are paying for it. The payment of advertising
expenses by a fund's adviser or underwriter does not appear to pre-
sent any problems so long as these costs are not passed on to fund
shareholders, for example, by changing the method of calculating the
management fee to increase each of the fund investor's proportionate
cost for management. 295 It is strictly a - business decision whether or
not to spend money on advertising,2" but the money spent should be
the adviser's and not that of the fund shareholders."'
The most direct source of payment for advertising is the fund it-
self, which realistically means the fund's shareholders. As previously
noted, a fund adviser which uses fund assets for promotional purposes
runs a substantial risk of being sued on the ground, among others, that
203 See discussion at pp. 983-94 supra.
294 See discussion at p. 985 supra.
299 For example, the management fee could be raised from the typical one-half of 1%
of net asset value to five-eighth of 1% of net asset value.
290 The primary benefit which increased advertising would produce is, of course,
increased sales, which in turn would result in increased net assets, and in most cases, an
increase in the management fee received by the fund's adviser.
297 For a discussion of the legal problems which may confront an adviser who pays
for advertising but then passes the cost on to fund shareholders, see pp. 986-88 supra.
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it had failed in its fiduciary duty to fund shareholders."8 And even if
the benefits derived from this promotion are passed on to the fund's
shareholders, a fund adviser may find itself in the same position as the
adviser in Moses v. Burgin with respect to the use of fund assets to
promote sales.
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the fact that existing re-
strictions on mutual fund advertising may be liberalized does not
necessarily mean that all mutual funds will increase their expendi-
tures for advertising. One reason is that it cannot be predicted
whether increased advertising within the limits of the rule changes pro-
posed by the SEC will result in increased sales. However, even if it is
assumed that an increased advertising effort would in fact result in
increased sales, the question arises as to who will pay for this adver-
tising effort. The answer to this question is not at all clear.*
CONCLUSION
The recent proposals by the SEC to liberalize somewhat the re-
strictions on mutual fund advertising are not only desirable but essen-
tial if mutual funds are to continue to be a viable investment medium,
especially for small investors. This is especially true since recent de-
velopments in the securities industry, such as negotiated rates or the
proposed prohibition of reciprocal practices, which are almost uni-
versally used by fund managers to induce the sale of their fund's
shares, may have a severe impact upon the traditional methods of
distributing fund shares. Increased mutual fund advertising may lessen
this impact in that those who sell mutual funds might have to spend
298 See discussion at p. 990 supra.
* On May 9, 1972, the SEC announced the adoption of rule changes relating to in-
vestment company advertising. Securities Act Release No. 5248. Although these changes
for the most part are the same as those proposed in Securities Act Release No. 5213
(Dec. 1, 1971), some modifications have been made and in some cases the scope of the
rules as proposed was clarified. For example, the release makes clear that the Staff's
position with respect to generic advertising as expressed in the Cashion opinion is no
longer the position of the Commission. In addition, the Commission considered the per-
centage test embodied in the proposed rules unworkable and substituted a requirement
that if an advertisement for investment company securities solicits inquiries and if in
response to such inquiries a prospectus is to be sent, the advertisement must state "the
number (and not the names) of such investment companies, and, if applicable, the fact
that the sponsor of the communication is the principal underwriter or investment ad-
visor in respect to such investment companies. . ." Although the modifications and
clarifications made by the Commission are important, the most significant statement in
the release announcing the rule changes was that:
The Commission considers the new provisions to be a modest step in the direc-
tion of liberalizing the rules relating to advertising for investment company se-
curities. . . It is anticipated that . . . further rules dealing with investment
company advertising will, at a later date, be noticed for comment by interested
persons.
It is thus apparent that the Commission has only just begun.
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less time educating the investing public regarding the value of mutual
funds as an investment medium, thereby spending more time actually
selling fund shares. Any loss of income occasioned by these develop-
ments may be offset by the income received because of increased
sales. In addition, more effective mutual fund advertising may reduce
reliance on individual salesmen. If the SEC's proposed rule changes
were adopted, thus permitting more effective advertising by mutual
funds, questions arise as to whether funds in general would increase
their advertising expenditures and, if so, as to who would bear the
burden of these expenditures. The first question is unanswerable be-
cause it cannot be predicted whether mutual funds will decide that the
potential benefits to be derived from increased advertising would ex-
ceed the burdens—i.e., the cost. If funds, however, do decide to adver-
tise extensively, it would seem that the expenditures involved should
be borne by the fund adviser or underwriter, to the extent that no
demonstrable benefits accrue to fund shareholders.
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BALTIMORE-WASHINGTON STOCK
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On February 4, 1972, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) issued a policy statement in the form of a special report en-
titled "Future Structure of the Securities Markets."' The policies an-
nounced in the report were designed to secure "three paramount
objectives"' as a means of enabling the securities industry to "per-
form an even more vital function in the economy of our country."'
The first objective was "to make the relationships in the securities
market and their operation as simple, as direct, and as open" as pos-
sible. To this end, the SEC has proposed a more competitive market
structure which would compel brokers to discard reciprocal, rebative
and recapturing practices and thereby to become more investor-ori-
ented.5
The second objective was "to adapt the securities markets to
growing institutionalization . . . while maintaining the confidence and
the participation of the individual investor." The SEC envisions a
single "central market system" as the most efficient and effective means
of achieving this objective? Such a system is intended to centralize
* BA., 'University of Pennsylvania, 1945; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania Law
School, 1948; President, Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Stock Exchange.
** B.A., Washington and Jefferson College, 1964; J.D., American University Law
School, 1967; Vice President, Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Stock Exchange.
SEC Policy Statement, Future Structure of the Securities Markets, (Feb. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as SEC Policy Statement].
2 Id. at 2.
Id. at 1.
4 Id. at 2.
5 Id. at 2-3. A "reciprocal" has been described as "an arrangement whereby, at the
discretion of a customer or fund manager, the executing broker rewards a broker who
has no role in connection with the execution of the transaction by furnishing him with
unrelated business . designed to produce a specific level of commission. . . ." Miller &
Carlson, Recapture of Brokerage Commissions by Mutual Funds, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 35,
36 n.6 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Miller & Carlson].
A rebate occurs "[w]hen an executing broker at the direction [and for the benefit]
of his customer [typically an investment adviser for a mutual fund or other type of
financial institution] gives up part of the commission to another broker who has not
participated in the transaction." Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 372 n.4 (1st Cir. 1971).
Recapture is the recovery of a portion of the executing broker's commissions for the
direct benefit of the institutional investor. See Miller & Carlson, supra, at 55-71,
e SEC Policy Statement, supra note 1, at 3.
7 Id. at 7-12. The SEC describes its proposed central market system as "a system of
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the buying and selling of all listed securities and to facilitate the
realization of the first objective—simple, direct and open relationships
and operations. The SEC believes that a central market system would
both strengthen the market, in order that it may better cope with the
growing volume of institutional trading, and make the investing public
aware of competition among the separate exchange markets, including
listed stock prices and trade volumes. 8
The final objective was to make "the professional service avail-
able to investors as efficient [ly] and economic [ally] as possible without
diluting standards of service and responsibility."° To achieve this result,
in light of the desired regulatory uniformity of a single central market
system, the SEC has endorsed a limited form of membership on all
stock exchanges for institutional members—broker-dealer affiliates of
mutual funds and other institutional investors. More specifically, the
brokerage subsidiaries of institutional investors would be required to
conduct a "predominant portion" of their brokerage commission busi-
ness for nonaffiliated sources."
The SEC's opposition to unrestricted institutional membership is
in large measure a response to the practice whereby institutional in-
vestors use their affiliated membership on an exchange "primarily as a
vehicle for obtaining recapture of commissions."' William J. Casey,
Chairman of the SEC, has stated that the Commission believes that it
"is harmful to public confidence and to the kind of professional re-
sponsibility which should characterize our securities markets for
brokerage firms to have the privilege of exchange membership without
the obligation, the responsibility and primary purpose of serving a
sector of the public other than their own affiliates." ' 2 However, this
position ignores the fact that millions of individuals invest their
savings in institutional pools of capital, and that these investors consti-
tute a significant "sector of the public" which is served by affiliated
brokers. In addition, the recent decision in Moses v. Burgin" indicates
that money managers owe a fiduciary duty to institutional shareholders
that requires managers to effect commission savings or to recapture
commissions.
communications by which the various elements of the marketplace ... are tied together.
It also includes a set of rules governing the relationships which will prevail among market
participants." Id. at 8.
Id. at 7-12.
9
 Id. at 4.
10 Id. at 53-54. The SEC stated that "(p)redominant means . . . significantly more
than half." Id. at 54. More recently, the Commission has indicated that "predominant"
means "significantly more than two-thirds" and possibly as much as 90%. The New York
Times, Feb. 6, 1972, § 3 (Business and Finance), at 9, col. 2.
11 SEC Policy Statement, supra note 1, at 48.
12 New York Times, Feb. 20, 1972, § 3 (Business and Finance), at 2, cols. 2-3.
13 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971).
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If implemented, the SEC policy of restricted institutional mem-
bership will have a major impact on regional stock exchanges which
presently allow affiliated brokerage membership." The Philadelphia-
Baltimore-Washington Stock Exchange (P-B-W) would be one of the
most significantly affected regional exchanges since affiliated broker-
members account for approximately fifty per cent of its business. In
effect, the regional exchanges would have to adopt restrictive admis-
sions requirements. On the other hand, the American and New York
Stock Exchanges, which prohibit institutional membership, would have
to broaden their admissions rules in order to comply with the SEC's
policy.15
Since publication of the SEC's special report announcing the
Commission's policy on institutional membership, a growing unrest,
headed by the P-B-W, has developed among many regional ex-
changes.1° Convinced that any benefits to be derived from restricting
institutional membership would be speculative and remote, the P-B-W
has reaffirmed its policy of unrestricted membership for broker-
dealers affiliated with mutual funds and other institutional investors."
Some regional exchanges, notably the Midwest, Pacific Coast and
Boston exchanges, have "expressed reservations about the Securities
and Exchange Commission's institutional-membership plan [and]
have been threatened with antitrust suits from concerns that would
lose their membership if the eligibility rules were tightened.”" Other
exchanges which appear to have acquiesced to the SEC's plan have
indicated that they will implement that policy only after being assured
that all exchanges will cooperate simultaneously."
This article will discuss the P-B-W's experience with institutional
14 In addition to the Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Stock Exchange (P-B-W),
other regional exchanges which presently have institutional members include: the Midwest
Stock Exchange (MWSE), the Pacific Court Stock Exchange (PCSE), and the Boston
Stock Exchange (BSE). The Cincinnati Stock Exchange does not have any institutional
members, but its rules do not prohibit such membership. Wall Street Journal, March 2,
1972, at 2, cols. 3-4.
16 Id.
18 Id,
11 Id., Feb. 10, 1972, at 2, col. 2.
18
 Id., March 2, 1972, at 2, col. 3. In response to a statement by SEC Chairman
William J. Casey that institutional members should be required to conduct approximately
80% of their brokerage business with unaffiliated public investors, MWSE President
Michael Tobin stated that this percentage was unnecessarily high for protecting public
investors: "A figure as high as 80% would ... not only be unduly restrictive in admitting
new members but might cut out a considerable number of existing, traditional members
that are basically brokerage houses but have created their own mutual funds or have
emphasized advisory or management services." Id.
Thomas P. Phelan, President of the PCSE, stated that "the commission's proposals
may have very serious anti-competitive effects, and we plan to examine this matter very
closely and on a continuing basis." Id.
18 Id. at 2, col. 3.
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membership. The advantages of broker-affiliated membership and an
analysis of the arguments against institutional membership will then
be examined in light of the recent SEC policy statement. Finally, it
will be concluded that the continued growth of unrestricted institu-
tional membership is in the public interest and that it will serve to
strengthen the public securities market.
I. THE P-B-W'S EXPERIENCE WITH INSTITUTIONAL MEMBERSHIP
A. Background
The P-B-W is a national securities exchange which permits the
membership of brokerage subsidiaries of institutional investors. Al-
though the constitution of this Exchange states that member orga-
nizations must be principally engaged in the business of a broker or
dealer in securities, this requirement refers only to the member and
not to its parent affiliation. 20 In short, the P-B-W has no rules which
prohibit institutional membership.
In December of 1967, the P-B-W claimed a total of 167 member
organizations, of which four were affiliated with institutions. In 1968,
the Exchange began admitting institutional affiliates in significant
numbers; at present it has 317 member organizations, of which forty-
five are broker subsidiaries of institutional investors. These affiliates
were admitted because they satisfactorily met the P-B-W's eligibility
standards, which require that the applicant (1) be financially re-
sponsible; (2) be run by professionally competent and experienced
personnel; and (3) be associated only with persons of integrity who
comply with the letter and spirit of the rules governing the Ex-
change.'
Unrestricted admissions requirements have been the primary factor
in the increased number of institutional members in the P-B-W; in
turn, this membership has substantially contributed to the growth of
the Exchange and to its strength as an independent, competitive
marketplace. In fact, from 1960-69, "[m]ost of the growth in the
securities industry . . . was due to [an] increase in securities transac-
tions by institutional investors. Moreover, since the average price of
shares traded by institutions has always been higher than the average
price of shares traded by individuals, the institutions accounted for
an even higher proportion of the dollar volume on all exchanges. 1)22
Institutional members on the P-B-W presently execute approximately
one-half of the orders transacted on the Exchange. As the institutional
20 P-E-W Constitution, art. XIV, { 2.
21 P-B-W Constitution, art. XI, § 6.
22 SEC, Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, pt. IV, at 2311-12 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC Institutional Investor Study].
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volume handled by these members has grown, there has been a corre-
sponding enhancement in the ability of broker-affiliates to find pur-
chasers or sellers for incoming orders on the floor of the Exchange.
The result has been a substantial improvement in the ability of Ex-
change members to execute noninstitutional orders, which has led to
the development of a willingness on the floor of the Exchange to posi-
tion securities at risk. As a consequence of the P-B-W's growth and
improved competitive position, the Exchange has been better able to
serve directly the needs of sound but small broker-dealers unable to
afford membership on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and,
indirectly, to serve the small individual customers of such firms.
B. Capitalization
Institutional membership on the P-B-W has also mitigated the
effects of a problem currently plaguing the securities industry—under-
capitalization. It has been observed that:
"Capital" in the securities industry often takes the form of
subordinated customers' accounts and volatile securities
(used for speculative purposes) rather than liquid funds that
would be fully available in a financial crisis.
Capital structures built on such an insubstantial base
were strained by the firms' increasing need for funds. Mem-
bers required capital not only to finance expansion of volume
but also to obtain computers to service the increased volume
and ... to position blocks of securities 2''
The capital committed by the institutional membership of the P-B-W,
which exceeds fifty million dollars, is dedicated almost exclusively
to broker-dealer activities, unlike that of many noninstitutional affili-
ates who, with increasing frequency, devote their capital to a multitude
of nonsecurities activities. For example, many of the latter brokerage
houses are "attempting to diversify into asset management. Like
banks, some want to move into every aspect of investment and finan-
cial services."24
As a group, the institutional membership of the P-B-W operates
under an aggregate indebtedness amounting to two to three times their
net capital. Roughly translated, this fact means that these institutional
members carry an aggregate indebtedness ranging between one hun-
dred and one hundred fifty million dollars. This situation presents no
real cause for concern since the institutional members of the P-B-W
are in a better position to meet additional capital requirements than
23 Carey & Werner, Outlook for Securities Markets, Ham Bus. Rev. 17-18 (July-Aug.
1971) thereinafter cited as Carey & Werner].
24 Id. at 18.
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most unaffiliated broker-dealers. The typical P-B-W institutional mem-
ber has as part of its corporate complex a large parent corporation
with ample funds to increase the capital of its affiliated member firm
as the need occurs. By contrast, the typical nonaffiliated broker-dealer
depends on much less accessible sources for capital—i.e., the money of
principals, subordinated private lenders and the public. The capital of
nonaffiliated brokers would be strained to the breaking point if such
members had to absorb an indebtedness proportionally comparable to
that of institutional members, particularly since history has shown that
private and public investors are reluctant to invest in a broker-dealer
during adverse market conditions which may themselves give rise to
further capital needs.
The securities industry is presently struggling for additional
capital." Expanded volume and probable limitations on the use of
customers' funds by broker-dealer firms—a practice commonly re-
ferred to as free credit balances"—will increase the necessity for
added capital. In response to this need, institutional membership has
benefitted the securities industry, the P-B-W and other regional ex-
changes, and other member firms and their customers by adding
capital to the industry and by keeping large orders within the exchange
system. Under these circumstances, the regulatory authorities cannot
ignore such a beneficial source of capital and the strength which
institutional membership imparts to the public securities market.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST INSTITUTIONAL
MEMBERSHIP
A. Unfair Cost-Savings Advantages
1. Fixed Minimum Commissions Rate Structure and Recapture—The
SEC Policy Report
Notwithstanding the favorable P-B-W experience, institutional
membership has been unfavorably received in certain quarters, most
notably the SEC: The Commission has cited the present structure of
a fixed minimum commission rate within the securities industry as one
reason for its opposition to institutional membership." This rate
structure imposes a fixed minimum brokerage commission on all orders
25
 Id. at 17-18.
26
 Free credit balances have been described as customer funds [which are] held
by a broker and [which] are not . . . subject to any rules which restrict their
use. Free customer credit balances form a substantial part of the working capital
of many broker-dealers and are often used for the general operating needs of the
broker-dealer's business, for financing its trading and investment accounts and
for loans to other customers to finance margin [i.e., credit] transactions.
Miller & Carlson, supra note 5, at 75 n.187.
27 SEC Policy Statement, supra note 1, at 28-34.
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having a value of $500,000 or less." Negotiated rates are permitted on
that portion of each order which exceeds $500,000." In fact, com-
missions charged on the latter portion are substantially lower than the
fixed rate."
To avoid or mitigate the cost of fixed brokerage commissions,
many institutional investors affiliated themselves with brokers and
effected substantial savings by means of recapture. However, the SEC
stated that "[s]o long as such a [rate] structure exists, large investors
should not, by virtue of their economic power and size, be entitled to
obtain rebates of commissions not available to other investors." 31 In
addition, the SEC decried recapture arrangements between institu-
tional investors and their affiliated brokers as a "use of exchange mem-
bership for private purposes rather than for the purpose of serving the
public in an agency capacity or otherwise performing a useful market
function."82
The thrust of the SEC's fixed commission argument against insti-
tutional membership was that affiliated arrangements provide institu-
tional investors with an unfair cost-saving advantage over smaller
nonaffiliated investors. However, in its recent policy report the Com-
mission removed some of the basis for this argument by announcing
that no later than April, 1972, the negotiated rate level would be
reduced to $300,000.33 This reduction means that the fixed minimum
commissions rate will apply only to orders having a value of $300,000
or less. SEC Chairman William J. Casey also has indicated that the
Commission may eventually lower the negotiated rate level to
$100,000." In fact, Senator Harrison A. Williams, Chairman of the
Senate Banking Subcommittee, has introduced a bill that would lower
the negotiated rate level to $100,000 beginning after December 31,
1973." Since negotiated commissions have proven to be substantially
lower than the fixed minimum rates, nonaffiliated investors now will
be able to effect significant savings. In addition, the reduced negotiated
rate level will nearly eliminate any imbalance in cost savings which
the SEC has alleged is unfair since " W here is general agreement that
on transactions below $100,000 the potential savings available through
exchange membership is much less significant.""
28 Id. at 28.
23 Id.
30 Id. at 32. See also Wall Street Journal, March 9, 1972, at 3, col. I.
31 SEC Policy Statement, supra note 1, at 46-47.
82
 Id. at 47.
83 Id, at 33.
34 Wall Street Journal, March 9, 1972, at 3, col. 1.
88 S. 3347, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See Wall Street Journal, March 13, 1972, at 8,
col. 4.
86 Id.
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Notwithstanding the impending action on the fixed minimum
commission rate schedules, the Commission's opposition to institu-
tional membership as a "use of exchange membership for private
purposes"" is but a vague and groundless argument which is incon-
sistent with the institutional membership situation experienced by the
P-B-W. Institutional membership on this exchange has permitted
financial institutions to internalize brokerage functions within their
corporate structure, thereby obviating the need to purchase brokerage
services. As a result, millions of dollars in commissions have been
saved by the institutions, savings which have been passed on to the
millions of individual investors represented by those corporate invest-
ment pools. In addition, the SEC's public-private distinction is incon-
sistent in light of the fact that the Commission has not attempted to
restrict certain "private" activities of noninstitutional members of the
various stock exchanges. The SEC's proposal that exchange members
should perform a "predominant portion" of their brokerage for un-
affiliated customers does not seem to preclude private activity, cur-
rently allowed by the NYSE, whereby nonaffiliated brokers concen-
trate a substantial portion of their activities on principal trading for
their own account."
Further, pursuant to its position that "public" brokerage activity
can occur only where "a predominant portion of [an exchange mem-
ber's] brokerage commission business [is conducted] for non-affiliated
persons,"" the SEC has stated that "[n]on-affiliated persons include
individual discretionary and non-discretionary accounts and the ac-
counts of non-affiliated institutions, but do not include institutional
parents or investment companies or other institutional funds which
are managed under contracts or arrangements which give the broker-
37 SEC Policy Statement, supra note 1, at 47.
38 In a recent letter to the SEC, Elkins Wetherill, President of the P-B-W and
co-author of this article, cited the following "private" activity which would not be
prohibited by the Commission's proposal:
Mlle Commission would permit Exchange membership to continue for firms:
(a) which are substantially engaged in floor trading or other principal trading for
their own accounts, or the accounts of their proprietors, in a non-market making
capacity, and/or (b) which limit their customers services to a very narrow seg-
ment of the investing public, such as giant managed accounts, and/or (c) derive
most of their profits, commit most of their capital and allocate most of their
personnel to activities other than serving as a broker or dealer in publicly traded
securities—for example, venture capital financing, mortgage banking, sale of
commodities, real estate or insurance, etc. Viewed from this light, we think that
our institutional members are much more appropriate for Exchange membership
than are many of the existing "conventional" member firms.
Letter from Elkins Wetherill to William J. Casey, March 2, 1972, in 142 BNA Sec. L.
Rep., at E-1 (March 3, 1972).
3D SEC Policy Statement, supra note 1, at 47.
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age firm investment discretion."'" Implicit in this definition is that the
sale of mutual fund shares or the shares of other institutional investors
by a broker does not constitute public activity if, but only if, the issuer
of the shares is managed by the broker—or an affiliate of the latter.
This is an extremely arbitrary distinction for which the SEC has, as
yet, offered no analytical justification, nor even an attempted explana-
tion.
Significantly, neither the SEC nor anyone else has ever represented
that institutional membership is not in the public interest. In fact,
financial institutions reprisent a substantial portion of the investing
public for whom affiliated exchange members faithfully perform
brokerage services. Thus the recapture of commissions by institutional
members is more aptly characterized as a benefit for a significant
faction of the investing public, rather than the execution of a "private
purpose." In addition, a recent decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit has held that institutional money man-
agers have a duty to effect brokerage commission savings whenever
possible; the court further indicated that there may be a duty to
recapture such commissions.
2. Moses v. Burgin
In Moses v. Burgin, 41 the investment adviser of a mutual fund
had withheld information for an extended period of time from the un-
affiliated, or "watch-dog," 42 members of the Fund's board of directors.
This information would have alerted the directors to the possibility,
and in fact the practicability, of using recapture in order to reduce
advisory fees." Because of defendants' inaction, recapture was not
41:1 Id. at 54.
41 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971).
42 The court described the function and purpose of "watch-dog" directors of invest-
ment advisers as follows:
Unlike an ordinary trust, or a business, management's normal activities are fre-
quently touched with [a] self-interest [which benefits] management at least as -
much as ... shareholders .... Congress ... responded to this problem by
enacting a mandatory provision for unaffiliated, that is, independent, watch-dog
directors. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) [11 10(a) of the Investment Company Act] ... •
Management [is] under a duty of full disclosure of information to these un-
affiliated directors in every area where there [is] even a possible conflict of
interest . . . .
445 F.2d at 376.
43 Information regarding the desirability of using recapture was presented to the
Management defendants on two occasions. In June, 1965, in the course of SEC inquiries
regarding the trading activities of the Fund on the Detroit Stock Exchange, an SEC
representative suggested that the defendants could effect indirect recapture for the benefit
of the Fund by obtaining "give 7ups"—wherein at the direction and for the benefit of
an investment adviser there is a relinquishment of some of the brokerage commissions on
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effected by the Fund. As a result, a stockholder derivative action
alleging a breach of fiduciary duty was instituted against the invest-
ment adviser and the Fund. More specifically, the plaintiff alleged that
"Fund's give-up practices . . . resulted in the loss of the value of
brokerage commissions which could have been recaptured . . . either
by creation of a broker affiliate that could participate in Fund port-
folio transactions, or by channeling present give-ups to an affiliate,
with the result that in either case the sums involved would be credited
to the fund."'" The defendant argued that there was no duty to recap-
ture, and that even if recapture could have been effected, as a practical
matter, "the directors still had a right to choose between recapture
of the give-ups for Fund's direct benefit, and awarding them to brokers
for its indirect benefit."45 In finding for the plaintiff, the court held
that "if [recapture] was freely available to Fund, the directors had no
such choice."' In making this determination, the court reasoned that
although sound business reasons" 47 preclude the imposition upon a
fund of a duty to acquire a broker affiliate, "[i]nsofar as a fund has a
broker affiliate" there is a duty to recapture whenever practicable."
The defendant also argued that recapture was illegal since it
violated the "anti-rebate" rules of the various stock exchanges." The
lower court had agreed, adding that recapture has "the evil conse-
quence of giving back to the customer a dollar credit traceable directly
or indirectly to the commission he paid."5° However, in response to
this contention the Court of Appeals stated:
The very fact that one type of rebate was uniformly toler-
ated by the exchanges despite their anti-rebate rules in itself
shows that logic alone cannot supply the answer. The con-
a particular transaction by the executing broker to another broker not connected with the
transaction—which could he offset against the advisory fee:
The suggestion ... should clearly have imparted to Management the idea that its
benefit could now conflict with Funds' interest—and should, in turn, have made
these defendants sensitive to the need for passing the suggestion along to the
unaffiliated directors.
Id. at 377.
Again in 1966, SEC representatives conducting inquiries into commission rate
structures suggested that recapture should be effected for the benefit of the Fund. Although
the conflict was clearly presented to Management's attention, the watch-dog directors
were still not informed. Id. at 378.
44 Id. at 372.
46 Id. at 374.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 375.
48 Id.
46 Id. at 381.
60 Moses v. Burgin, 316 F. Supp. 31, 57 (D. Mass. 1970). This statement by the
district court has been criticized as overstating the limitation ascribed to the anti-rebate
rules since dollar-for-dollar offsetting is allowed. 69 BNA Sec. L. Rep., at A-2 (Sept. 23,
1970).
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trolling answer must be found in how the exchanges, who
were the rule-makers, themselves translated their rules. We
have seen that the Pacific and PBW exchanges, when con-
fronted with proposals for recapture, chose to permit it.' 1
The First Circuit Court of Appeals was not alone in its recogni-
tion of a duty to recapture whenever practicable in broker-affiliate
situations. Shortly after the Moses v. Burgin suit was instituted in
December, 1971, the SEC issued a release proposing a new rule, 10b-
10, which provided:
(1.) It shall be unlawful for any registered investment com-
pany or affiliated person of such registered investment com-
pany to directly or indirectly, to [sic] order or request any
broker or dealer:
(a) to pay or arrange for the payment, directly or in-
directly, of all or any portion of a commission on any secu-
rities transaction to any broker, dealer or any other person
unless pursuant to a written contract the full amount of such
remittance is required to be paid over to such registered in-
vestment company, or fees owed by or charged to such regis-
tered investment company are required to be reduced in an
amount equal to the remittance. . . . 52
Although the acknowledged purpose of the proposed rule was to pro-
hibit give-up practices, the release stated that "[t]he reasoning on
which the proposed rule is based is that if ... a mutual fund manager
has various means at his disposal to recapture for the benefit of the
fund a portion of the commissions paid by the fund, he is under a fidu-
ciary duty to do so."Ga The Commission later withdrew the 10b-10
proposal, but only because the New York Stock Exchange and other
exchanges initiated their own rules prohibiting give-ups."
Both the Moses decision and the SEC release regarding rule lob-
10 confirmed the legality and desirability of recapture. The direct
beneficiaries of recapture are the many individuals who have invested
their savings in institutional investment programs. For example, in a
mutual fund situation
[i]f Fund receives the asset value of new shares, but at the
same time rewards the selling broker with give-ups that it
has a right to recapture for itself, then the net income Fund
receives from the process of selling a share is less than the
51 445 F.2d at 382.
52 33 Fed. Reg. 2393 (1968).
53 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968) [1967-1969 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,523, at 83,085 (emphasis added).
54 Miller & Carlson, supra note 5, at 35 n.I.
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asset value. The existing shareholders have contributed—by
paying more than otherwise necessary on Fund's portfolio
transactions—to the cost of the sale, which was supposed to
have been borne by the new member alone.'"
In addition, since institutional investors represent a signifiCant portion
of the investing public, and since the benefits of recapture accrue to
these individuals, it must be concluded that recapture, made possible
by institutional membership, is in the public interest.
3. Other Motives for Affiliation and Congressional Criticism of the
SEC Policy Report
It should be noted that "reducing the cost of brokerage commis-
sions to the accounts managed by the institutional investor" 68
 has not
been the only reason for affiliation between financial institutions and
broker-dealers. Some affiliations "were motivated as investments for
the parent rather than as a means of combining in one enterprise the
brokerage and management of accounts"; 67
 other affiliations were the
result of a desire by financial institutions "to be affiliated with an
organized distribution system."" In its recent policy statement, the
SEC found little objection with these motivations since the resulting
membership usually included' business dealings with those investors
who have been vaguely characterized by the SEC as the "general
public."50
 The Commission apparently condones such affiliations since
they provide "a useful source of permanent capital for the securities
industry."°° Thus it would seem that the SEC's primary objection to
institutional membership is really a result of the Commission's staunch
opposition to recapture within a fixed minimum commissions rate
structure. However, as has been discussed, the impending reduction
in the negotiated rate level may obviate this objection.
In this respect the SEC's recent policy statement drew criticism
from Senator Williams, for "moving so 'slowly and cautiously' to
eliminate fixed rates and so 'promptly' to eliminate exchange mem-
berships that some institutions have acquired for the purpose of reduc-
ing 'high' fixed-commission costs levied on their stock transactions."'
Representative John E. Moss, Chairman of the House Banking Sub-
committee, who also criticized the SEC for attempting to resolve the
55 445 F.2d at 374.
5° SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 22, at 2296.
51' Id. at 2299.
58 Id. at 2300.
:0 Id.
Policy Statement, Future Structure of the Securities Markets, at 49 (Feb.,
1972) [hereinafter cited as SEC Policy Statement].
00 
01 Wall Street Journal, Feb. 3, 1972, at 3, cal. 2.
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institutional membership issue "without waiting for congressional
guidance,"" further stated that "the implementation of any far-
reaching proposals, pending the final determination by Congress,
[would not] be in the public interest."' To check the SEC's undue
haste in this matter, Senator Williams has introduced a proposal which
would remove the Commission's power to restrict institutional mem-
bership until one year after the $100,000 negotiated rate level is in
force, at which time "we should be in a far better position to determine
whether there is an 'institutional membership problem' or whether it
is simply a symptom of the 'fixed commission rate problem.'""
B. Fragmentation of the Securities Market
Another argument advanced against institutional membership is
that the trend of institutional trading will "fragment" the securities
market." This trend has been characterized by an unprecedented
growth in the volume of securities transactions" and by a correspond-
ing pressure, generated by institutions, to lower commissions. 87 It has
been suggested that this pressure plus "the inability of the specialist
system to cope with the demands of an institutionalized marketplace"'
will fragment the market by shifting trade away from the New York
Stock Exchange to the regional stock markets, particularly the
P-B-W." In this way, the New York Stock Exchange has argued, "the
realistic pricing of securities, reflecting the full forces of supply and
demand, will be impaired.""
However, this argument is fallacious since it confuses the growing
institutionalization of stock market trading with the growing institu-
tional role in brokerage activity. The dramatic trend toward institu-
tionalized markets which marked the decade of the 1960's 71 has not
resulted from the relatively new, and as yet insignificant, phenomenon
of institutional membership on exchanges. While it is true that
the more trading an institutional investor funnels through its regional
02 Id.
63 Id.
04 S. 3169, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See Wall Street Journal, March 13, 1972,
at 8, col. 4.
65 See SEC Policy Statement, supra note 59, at 6; New York Times, Feb. 20, 1972,
{ 3 (Business and Finance), at 2, col. 1; and Carey & Werner, supra note 23, at 17.
66 SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 22, at 2311. For example, on the
NYSE securities transactions by institutional investors increased by 548% during the
period 1960-69. Id.
67 Carey & Werner, supra note 23, at 17.
6° Id.
69 Id. See also New York Times, Feb. 20, 1972, § 3 (Business and Finance), at 1,
col. 8, and at 2, col. 1.
70
 New York Times, Feb. 20, 1972, § 3 (Business and Finance), at 2 col. 1.
71 See note 66 supra.
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exchange broker-affiliate the less commission income NYSE mem-
bers receive, this factor is a result of the NYSE's outmoded prohibi-
tion against broker-affiliates," and not a fault of institutional member-
ship. In addition, the lowering of the negotiated rate level to $300,000
will result in reduced commission income for brokers on all exchanges,
and the proposed $100,000 level, if enacted, will remove any remaining
illusory vestiges which might have been used as a basis for the "frag-
mentation" argument.
The SEC's recent endorsement of a single, totally-integrated
market also strikes at the heart of this argument. Because of techno-
logical developments in computerized communication, the central
market system will provide all marketplaces with readily available in-
formation on completed trades, as well as quotations in all market-
places. In this way, "the realistic pricing of securities, reflecting the
full forces of supply and demand,"" will be assured, notwithstanding
any shifts in trade volume from one marketplace to another. In addi-
tion, since the central market system will require the "[e]stablishment
of terms and conditions upon which any qualified broker-dealer [in-
cluding institutional affiliates] can obtain access to all exchanges,'
there will be little likelihood that trading will be diverted to "inap-
propriate" marketplaces so as to distort "the realistic pricing of
securities."
C. The Dealer-Oriented Market
It has also been argued that institutional membership ultimately
may cause the brokerage business to become dominated by financial
institutions intent on building captive sales forces." It is contended
that this build-up could lead to a dealer-oriented market. It is further
argued that such a market would eliminate the broker-customer
agency relationship by driving small, nonaffiliated brokerage firms out
of business, and by eliminating the individual investor's ability to
trade against institutions. 78
 However, if the increasingly institutional-
ized markets are leaning more toward the dealer function of selling
shares, it is because this orientation is better suited to satisfy the
legitimate needs of institutional investors, through whom millions of
Americans invest. For example, the continual selling of shares is of
T 2
 This prohibtion is embodied in NYSE Rule 318, CCH NYSE Guide 11 2318 (1970).
73 New York Times, Feb. 20, 1972, § 3 (Business and Finance), at 2, col. 1.
74 SEC Policy Statement, supra note 59, at 10.
76 See New York Times, Feb. 20, 1972, § 3 (Business and Finance), at 2, col. 1;
and, Miller & Carlson, Recapture of Brokerage Commissions by Mutual Funds, 46 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 35, 75 (1971).
78 New York Times, Feb. 20, 1972 § 3 (Business and Finance), at 2, col. 1-2.
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particular importance to a mutual fund, which must always be pre-
pared to redeem its shares:
A continual flow of new money may be beneficial in giving
the adviser more flexibility in managing the portfolio, in
achieving long-term investment goals and in avoiding sales of
portfolio securities at inopportune times to meet redemp-
tions. • . . Additionally, continual sales might reduce the per
share portion of the management fee funds which scale down
fees as assets under management increase."
Thus it would seem that the extent to which the securities market has
been, and will become, dealer-oriented will be determined by the level
of institutionalization of the market, not institutional membership. In
fact, contrary to the dangers attributed to institutional membership,
the P-B-W has been inundated by no adverse impact on nonblock
trade volume (orders of less than 2,000 shares) 78 as a result of its
unrestricted membership policy.
It is interesting to note that many firms own seats on the NYSE
in order to trade for their own account," and some deal more for such
accounts rather than acting as broker-agents for customers. Yet, no
one has suggested that these firms should lose their NYSE membership
because of their dealer orientation. Nor has it been expressed that
these firms should be required to devote more of their resources to
servicing the individual investor.
D. The Subsidization of Nonaffiliated Members
Implicit in the preceding argument by the NYSE that institutional
membership will result in a substantial decline in the number of broker-
dealers available to serve individual investors is the suggestion that
broker affiliations should be prohibited in order that the profits derived
from institutional brokerage commissions might accrue to nonaffiliated
brokers, to subsidize the brokerage services available to such investors.
77 Miller & Carlson, supra note 75, at 65. In fact, in February, 1972, mutual fund
redemptions exceeded sales by $88,000,000, and the industry experienced net redemptions
during 5 of the 12 months preceding this date. The New York Times, March 21, 1972,
at 57, col. 7.
78 The SEC has suggested that block trade could be defined as "a securities trans-
action that, because of its size or other characteristics, requires special handling." SEC,
Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, pt. IV,
at 1537 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC Institutional Investor Study]. However, the
Commission recognized that this definition is inadequate, and possibly for this reason the
various exchanges have defined block trades in terms of order sizes. For example, the NYSE
generally defines block trade as orders of 10,000 or more shares, Id. at 1537. Most regional
exchanges, including the P-B-W, define block trades as orders of 2,000 or more. Id. at 1819.
79 Carey & Werner, Outlook for Securities Markets, Harv. Bus. Rev. at 23 (July-Aug.
1971).
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In effect, this suggestion of a subsidy would necessitate subjecting
brokers handling institutional accounts to public-utilities type regula-
tions, which would insure that the brokers did in fact subsidize and
service the small investors as well as the financial institutions.
However, available statistics support neither the subsidy ap-
proach nor the argument upon which the suggestion is based. The
NYSE presently prohibits institutional membership" and, therefore,
approaches the operating conditions favored by that exchange. Of the
more than 250 member firms on the NYSE, only approximately one
and one-half per cent of these members derive twenty-five per cent or
more of their gross income from institutional commissions." Approxi-
mately thirty-six per cent of the NYSE members derive less than five
per cent of their gross income from institutional commissions," and
over eighty per cent of the member firms derive no more than fifteen
per cent of their commission income from institutions.88 Simply trans-
lated, these statistics indicate that exchange membership for institu-
tional dealer affiliates on the NYSE would affect, at most, only a small
percentage of nonaffiliated members.
In addition, even though affiliated firms would be primarily en-
gaged in institutional brokerage business, not retail activities for indi-
vidual public investors, such a situation would be substantially identi-
cal to the existing NYSE business pattern. This result would occur
notwithstanding the imposition of a subsidy situation. As discussed
above, subsidization would require the promulgation of public-utility
type regulations. However, not even the NYSE has suggested imposing
such rules on brokerage firms. Thus the subsidy approach would fail
in its objective since the recipients of the subsidy—nonaffiliated brok-
ers for institutional investors—need not, and by and large presently
do not, render the services to individual investors which are intended
to be subsidized.
E. Conflicts of Interest
Finally, the NYSE has argued that institutional membership
poses unique conflict of interest problems." It is alleged that affiliated
members may effect unnecessary brokerage activity through unwar-
ranted portfolio turnover—churning"---in order to generate commis-
sions, and that broker affiliates may avoid marketplaces from which
the best execution is available. However, since many institutional
88 See note 72 supra.
81 SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 78, at 2236.
82 Id.
88 Id.
84 Carey & Werner, supra note 79, at 23.
85 Id.
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members are wholly-owned subsidiaries of their parent institutions
whose profits accrue directly to the parent, no unique conflict of interest
is presented. In fact, the relationship between an affiliated member
firm and its parent is more free from potential conflict of interest prob-
lems than that of the conventional nonaffiliated broker and its cus-
tomer.
It should be noted that potential conflicts of interest do arise in
"fund complex" arrangements. 8° In this situation, a group of financial
institutions are externally managed "by separately owned and operated
organizations known as investment advisers or managers." 87 Here, the
broker-dealer is a subsidiary of the external money manager and
performs brokerage services for an investment pool not beneficially
owned by the parent-manager. Thus the external management struc-
ture is conducive to conflicts of interest, since "the manager does
benefit from reciprocity in increased fund share sales commissions and
management fees and does benefit where its affiliate retains commis-
sions on fund portfolio brokerage."88
However, since broker-dealers affiliated with institutions do per-
form brokerage services for investments beneficially owned by the
institutional parent, this conflicts situation is not present in the institu-
tional membership situation. In fact, with the exception of institutional
membership arrangements, this particular conflict is common to the
securities industry whenever the functions of a money manager and
broker are combined. Many NYSE members are permitted to combine
these functions, while institutional applicants performing identical
duties are denied NYSE membership." Gustave Levy, former Chair-
man of the NYSE, has conceded that "[o]ur Achilles heel has always
been that we have been in the money-managing business, but the
managers could not get into ours."" In fact, the SEC has indicated
that:
[I] n enacting the Investment Company Act Congress appar-
ently did not find it necessary that the brokerage and invest-
ment company functions be completely separated. There are
potential conflicts of interest in these relationships, as well as
in the broker-underwriter relationship, the money manager-
underwriter relationship and the dealer-money manager rela-
tionship. If all of these functions were to be separated, the
capital-raising capability of the industry and its ability to
serve the public could be significantly weakened. We there-
86 Miller & Carlson, supra note 75, at 42.
sr Id.
88 Id. at 49-50.
89 Carey & Werner, supra note 79, at 23.
uo Id.
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fore believe that the conflict of interest problem which is
inherent in the combination of money management and
brokerage is a matter to be resolved by Congress."
Commis -10N
The P-B-W's experience with institutional membership indicates
that affiliated membership is beneficial to the exchange, to its non-
affiliated members and their customers, and to the investing public.
The volume of trade generated and the capital committed by the
institutional members have contributed substantially to the growth
of the P-B-W, strengthening the position of the exchange as an inde-
pendent competing marketplace. As a result, the P-B-W has been able
to serve directly the needs of sound, but small, nonaffiliated firms that
are unable to afford NYSE membership. In this way, the exchange
has been able to serve, indirectly, the small individual customers of
those firms.
Institutional membership has been attacked, primarily by the
SEC, as being contrary to the best interests of the securities industry.
The underlying reason for this opposition is the cost-savings ad-
vantage which accrues to institutional investors. However, the
impending reduction of the negotiated rate level and the recent deci-
sion in Moses v. Burgin have substantially vitiated the recapture argu-
ment. Other arguments—concerning fragmentation of the industry,
the evolution of a dealer-oriented market and the subsidization of non-
affiliated members—must also be discounted, since they represent
problems inherent in the institutionalization of the securities market,
which is not to be confused with institutional membership.
Further, it is recognized that institutional membership does not
present a potential conflict of interest problem in the external manage-
ment situation. This potential conflict is a product of the investment
manager-broker relationship. However, with the exception of institu-
tional membership, this relationship and the attendant conflicts prob-
lem are familiar to the securities industry. Institutional membership
has significantly benefitted the securities industry by providing capital
commitments and by keeping large orders within the exchange system.
The continued growth of such membership, untramelled by restrictions
based on artificial justifications, will undoubtedly strengthen the public
securities market.
in SEC Policy Statement, supra note 59, at 52-53.
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